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The Trouble with Regulating Microfinance
Anita Bernstein*
In its short lifetime, the neologism "microfinance" has become central to
several realms-among them philanthropy, social entrepreneurship,
commercial banking, and economic development efforts underway in
numerous nations-with no consensus on what the word includes and
excludes. Indeterminacy makes microfinance resemble other abstract
polysyllabic Latinate words like "nationalization, " "industrialization,"
"privatization, " "globalization, " and "democracy. " Unlike these other
nouns, however, microfinance has struck observers as amenable to unitary
regulation.
Well-intentioned proposals start from the erroneous premise that a single
statute, best-practices compendium, or set of governing principles can cover
all of microfinance. These efforts are destined to fail until reformers pause to
consider the goals they can pursue and the varied sectors they address. The
word has its uses. Before microfinance can be regulated, however, it must be
disaggregated.
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INTRODUCTION
Banking delivered in small-scale transactions to low-income clients,
known since the mid-1990s as "microfinance," appears to cry out for law-
based controls. Even governments lacking the will or expertise to regulate
other industries and sectors have paid heed to loans and other financial
instruments offered to clients who are too poor to access traditional bank
services.' Experts share this view: Microfinance Needs Regulation.2
Room for disagreement remains, of course. Discussions fill lively
literatures in a variety of disciplines, especially on whether legal controls
ought to encourage, or instead curb, lending to poor people.3 While
differences flourish, however, informed opinion unites in support of
regulation.
' See infra Part III.A. 1.
2 Aneel Karnani, Microfinance Needs Regulation, 9 STAN. Soc. INNOVATION REV. 48
(Winter 2011), available at http://www.ssireview.org/images/articles/2011WI Feature
Karnani.pdf; see also Aaron Jones, Note, Promotion of a Commercial Viable Microfinance
Sector in Emerging Markets, 13 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 187, 199-203 (2006)
(noting that observers agree on the need to regulate microfinance but disagree on what this
regulation should provide); Shelley Thompson, Note, 80 Simple Rules: The Effective and
Sustainable 2009 Rwandan Microfinance Regulations, 38 SYRACUSE J. INT'L. L. & COM. 415,
420 (2011) (observing that regulation is salutary for microfinance institutions themselves).
See infra Part II.
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From this consensus, efforts to codify the definitive set of microfinance
rules have escalated.4 Each new statement of regulatory goals or ideals
appears to inspire the next set of drafters to do it again and do it better.
Although Microfinance Needs Regulation stays in place as a commitment,
enthusiasts have not completed, and appear unable to complete, the project
that they have deemed necessary.
When one considers the extraordinary talent and ample funding that
underlie attempts to write the optimal rules for microfinance, this failure
cries for an explanation. Drafters like the Consultative Group to Assist the
Poor, the Basel Commission on Banking Supervision, and the World Bank
have drawn on sophisticated data sets, years of experience, well-curated
troves of national and local regulations, good will, good intentions, and the
participation of researchers who enjoy international renown. These
strengths having failed to achieve the goal-that is to say, no definitive
regulation of microfinance having emerged-I raise in this Article the
possibility that expertise in microfinance might impede rather than advance
the undertaking.
The trouble with regulating microfinance is not the burden of regulation
on microfinance providers or their stakeholders-like every other observer
who writes in this field, I accept the need for legal rules-but, I argue,
"microfinance" itself. The word has brought together constituents that for
purposes of regulation ought to remain separate. Microfinance is no more
amenable to a best-practices regulatory recitation than any other broad-
swath Latinate noun that describes macroeconomic conditions.
Policymakers who would never have tried to summarize in one document
a scheme to regulate "industrialization," "globalization," "privatization," or
"democracy" may have been misled by the "micro" in microfinance, which
makes their target look small and well-cabined. It is no such thing.
Because the term blurs lines that matter, any single set of regulatory
considerations for microfinance will necessarily be either wrong (at least
with respect to some entities or individuals in the cohort addressed) or
vague to the point of meaninglessness. Accordingly the notion of
Microfinance Needs Regulation, explained in Part I as resting on
aggregations of crises that generate and accompany aggregations of
recommendations, becomes a blueprint for the reiteration of failure.
4 See infra Part I.A.
s The linguistic term "polysemy," referring to overlapping and multiple meanings
present in a single word, is on point. See Charles J. Fillmore & B.T.S. Atkins, Describing
Polysemy: The Case of "Crawl, " in POLYSEMY: THEORETICAL AND COMPUTATIONAL
APPROACHES 91, 91 (Yael Ravin & Claudia Leacock eds., 2000) (noting what the verb "to
crawl" can signify).
3
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Readers will recall the distinction between what the biologist George
Gaylord Simpson once called "lumpers" and "splitters": When making
classifications, lumpers focus on large units; splitters focus on smaller
ones.6 Microfinance as neologism is the work product of a lumper.
The coinage aptly brings together a cluster of deprivations, challenges,
innovations, and opportunities faced by the unbankable poor.7
"Microfinance" gathers into one word a set of needs and pursuits that could
easily fill a paragraph. It has a place in policy: banking for poor people is,
and ought to remain, vital in national and transnational debates. Yet
because the label tells nothing about conditions that the law finds
meaningful-such as those found in banking law and rules related to
corporate governance-it unites what ought to receive analytically separate
legal controls rather than a unitary response. Part II of this Article reviews
some lexical difficulties inherent in the word.
Presenting a splitter-repair to fix a lumper source of confusion, this
Article makes suggestions in broad-survey outline form. My starting point
is to consider what legal controls might aspire to achieve. Here I presume
that regulators want to improve the delivery of small-scale loans and
savings.
An alternative to Microfinance Needs Regulation emerges after
microfinance is disaggregated. Exploring the question broached in Part
II-just what is microfinance?-Part III offers an unglamorous answer:
banking for low-income savers and borrowers.9 Clearing away high-sizzle
6 George G. Simpson, The Principles of Classification and a Classification of
Mammals, 85 BULL. AM. MUSEUM NAT. HisT. 1, 23 (1945). For a recent reference to the
dichotomy, see Peter H. Schuck, Professor Rabin and the Administrative State, 61 DEPAUL
L. REV. 595, 611 (2012).
7
"Unbankable" entered the financial-development literature with IBRAHIMA
BACKHOUM, BANKING THE UNBANKABLE: BRINGING CREDIT TO THE POOR (1989). See also
GERT VAN MAANEN, MICROCREDIT: SOUND BUSINESS OR DEVELOPMENT INSTRUMENT 17
(2004) ("In general, banks are for people with money, not for people without.").
Other motives might occupy regulators. See ROBERT BALDWIN & MARTIN CAVE,
UNDERSTANDING REGULATION: THEORY, STRATEGY, AND PRACTICE 22 (1999) (reviewing
regulatory capture and public choice, both of which ascribe self-interest to regulators'
decisions).
9 "Microfinance" as neologism tacitly favors the perspective of wealthy providers over
that of their clientele. "Micro" is a gradable adjective: a savings account or a loan is small
only when compared to something bigger. See generally Paul Egr6 & Nathan Klinedinst,
Introduction: Vagueness and Language Use, in VAGUENESS AND LANGUAGE USE 5 (Paul
Egrd & Nathan Klinedinst eds., 2011) (describing gradable adjectives). Billion-dollar
undertakings are not called macrofinance to reference their large size; they are simply
finance, and from the vantage point of poor borrowers or savers, microfinance is simply
finance. A wordier phrase like "banking for low-income savers and borrowers" brings these
people to the foreground.
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jargon returns regulators to a familiar task. Part IV continues this
disaggregation by assessing opportunities to save and borrow with
reference to who owns provider institutions.' 0
Providers of microfinance, the entities that need to be regulated, fall into
three groups. The first group consists of entities whose members share the
benefits of safety and risk. These institutions hold, lend, and collect money
for and by their members. Owners and clients are the same people. They
pool their holdings in pursuit of mutual aid. The two other ownership-
based categories of microfinance providers are for-profit and nonprofit
entities. Though occasionally blurred rather than bright," the line between
the two is familiar and widely heeded around the world. Nations that have
codified any corporation law at all recognize both types of firms. The
universality and familiarity of the division between nonprofit and for-profit
comport with regulatory priorities for microfinance.
Each category of microfinance provider has distinct pursuits. For
individuals who pool their money in affiliations like rotating credit
associations and credit unions, microfinance is a source of goods and
opportunities in daily human lives. Managers and donors of nonprofit
microfinance institutions, for their part, envision and practice microfinance
as poverty reduction and other eleemosynary goals.12 Commercial banks
experience microfinance as a source of new markets; for banks,
microfinance diversifies portfolios and expands sources of income to
owners.
Regulators ought to bear in mind that these customers are poor, for at least two
reasons. First, vulnerability-including information asymmetry, impediments to self-
protection, externalities, and unequal bargaining power-is fundamental to regulation
generally, see BALDWIN & CAVE, supra note 8, at 9-16 ("Why regulate?"), and poor people
are exceptionally vulnerable. Second, this subcategory of banking is distinct because it
includes transactions that are too small to be profitable on a per-unit basis. A provider has to
deviate from banking practices used for prosperous customers-it might charge fees for
savings accounts, impose interest rates that look usurious, or come up with substitutes for
collateral like lending to a circle of borrowers-when offering financial services to the poor.
See Lan Cao, Rethinking Microfinance, 33 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 971, 986 (2012). I thank
Jeffrey Thomas for his insights on this point.
10 Here I follow the convention that excludes from the microfinance rubric those entities
and persons who hold or lend money without purporting to follow the law. "Loansharks"
and "moneylenders" are providing microfinance, if microfinance is understood as financial
transactions and services furnished to poor customers; but because these words bespeak an
unwillingness to abide by financial regulation, such providers lie outside the scope of this
Article.
" See generally Dana Brakman Reiser, Charity Law's Essentials, 86 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1 (2011) (asking, with regulation in mind, what exactly characterizes a charity).
12 Jonathan Morduch, The Microfinance Schism, 28 WORLD DEv. 617 (2000).
13 BLUE ORCHARD MICROFINANCE INVESTMENT MANAGERS, Microfinance: an
5
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Laws around the world authorize some nonprofit institutions, banks that
pursue profit, and mutual-aid entities to offer credit or savings to low-
income clients. Doing so gives these providers something in common.
When holding or lending money, however, they pursue different ends.
Charitable missions, earnings returned as profit to external owners, and
earnings returned to internal owners in a mutual-aid scheme are
fundamentally unalike.
Because these types of entities generate different opportunities and
consequences, the job of regulating them calls for rules that are not
monolithic, along with tailored combinations of encouragement and
constraint. Treating the different providers of microfinance as a single
industry or sector is a regulatory mistake. Polysemy is all very well in
language-probably inevitablel 4-but when a word that encompasses so
much divergence becomes the object of a unitary rulebook, disarray ensues.
I. "MICROFINANCE NEEDS REGULATION"
Several conditions manifest in microfinance support the consensus about
its needing regulation. First and most generally, microfinance is market
activity of a type that has experienced considerable market failure.'
Second, microfinance encompasses consumer banking, a domain long
identified as suited to government oversight.16 Third, as a technology of
national economic development that has been credited and blamed for both
prosperity and ruinous debt,17 microfinance appears simultaneously too
valuable to ban and too risky to leave unattended. Finally, microfinance is
a sector in which inadequate education and economic stresses impede the
ability of individual participants to know, assert, and safeguard their
interests.' 8
alternative asset class, http://www.blueorchard.com/jahia/Jahia/pid/399 (last visited Oct. 24,
2012).
14 See Fillmore & Atkins, supra note 5.
"s See infra Part I.B.
16 See generally Ronald J. Gilson, Henry Hansmann, & Mariana Pargendler, Regulatory
Dualism as a Development Strategy: Corporate Reform in Brazil, the United States, and the
European Union, 63 STAN. L. REv. 475 (2011) (connecting this need with national
development imperatives).
17 See infra Part II.B.
18 Anita Bernstein & Hans Dieter Seibel, Reparations, Microfinance, and Gender: A
Plan, with Strategies for Implementation, 44 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 75, 90-94 (2011)
(summarizing various disempowering conditions that impede micro-borrowers); Rashmi
Dyal-Chand, Reflections in a Distant Mirror: Why the West Has Misperceived the Grameen
Bank's Vision of Microcredit, 41 STAN. J. INT'L L. 217, 261-66 (2005) (reporting empirical
findings about oppression in the Grameen model).
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Mindful of these circumstances regulators, starting in the late 1990s,
have been addressing the problem of how to regulate this sector.
Comprehensive statements purporting to govern microfinance-drafted in
the form of legislation, principles, guidelines, best practices, and other
schemes-have proliferated. They continue to emerge.
A. What Reformers Have Offered
Proposals to regulate microfinance have taken varying approaches that
reflect an array of goals and priorities for rule-writers, surveyed here with
examples of each.
1. Disaggregation and Reaggregation
The World Bank, an international financial institution whose motto is
"Working for a World Free of Poverty,"19 published the first comprehensive
proposal in 1998.20 Emphasizing disaggregation, the Framework for
Regulating Microfinance Institutions focused on risk management and
"prudential"-i.e. bank-supervisory-considerations.2  It divided
microfinance providers into three categories and seven types.22
The Consultative Group to Assist the Poor ("CGAP"), an entity housed at
the World Bank but established as "independent" 23 and funded by donor
agencies and private foundations,2 4 has offered an alternative set of
recommendations for microfinance regulation.25 Its description of
19 THE WORLD BANK GROUP, Working For a World Free ofPoverty (2006), available at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTABOUTUS/Resources/wbgroupbrochure-en.pdf
20 Hennie van Greuning, Joselito Gallardo, & Bikki Randhawa, A Framework for
Regulating Microfinance Institutions, FINANCIAL SECTOR DEVELOPMENT DEPARTMENT, THE
WORLD BANK (1998), http://elibrary.worldbank.org/docserver/download/ 2061.pdf ?ex pire
s=1351231135&id-id&accname=guest&checksum--ABE46DICB3Bl7EDAEOE1381024A
E63C9 [hereinafter van Greuning et al., Framework]. "The term 'World Bank" refers only
to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the International
Development Association (IDA)." See THE WORLD BANK, About The World Bank,
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTSITETOOLS/0,,contentMDK:201474
66-menuPK:344189-pagePK:98400-piPK:98424-theSitePK:95474,00.html#2 (last visited
Oct. 25, 2012).
21 van Greuning et al., Framework, supra note 20.
22 Id. at ii.
23 See CGAP, http://www.cgap.org/about (last visited Oct. 25, 2012).
24 The World Bank provides this data at THE WORLD BANK, http://sitere sources.
worldbank.org/INTDGF/DGFPrograms/21870033/CGAP.pdf (last visited Oct. 25, 2012).
25 Robert Peck Christen, Timothy R. Lyman, & Richard Rosenberg, Microfinance
Consensus Guidelines: Guiding Principles on Regulation and Supervision of Microfinance,
CGAP/THE WORLD BANK GROUP (2003), http://www.cgap.org/sites/default/files/CGAP-
7
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microfinance purports to cover all sources of this product: "non-
government organizations (NGOs); cooperatives; community-based
development institutions like self-help groups and credit unions;
commercial and state banks; insurance and credit card companies;
telecommunications and wire services; post offices; and other points of
sale."26
2. Microfinance Understood as For-Profit Banking
For the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, a transnational entity
formed in 1930 "to foster international cooperation" among national central
banks "in their pursuit of monetary and financial stability,"27 regulating
microfinance is a subset of regulating banks. The Basel Committee
published Microfinance Activities and the Core Principles for Effective
Banking Supervision in 201 0.28 Celebrated among poverty-reduction
activists as "the first paper ever by the Basel Committee on a financial
inclusion topic," 29 this proposal for comprehensive regulation focuses on
deposit-taking institutions.
3. Microfinance Commandments
The European Commission published its take on microfinance regulation
in 2007. Unlike the World Bank, CGAP, and Basel documents, which all
espouse universalism, The Regulation of Microcredit in Europe addresses
only one (large and affluent) geographic region. It differs from the other
three also in favoring description over prescription; its recitation of precepts
appears at the end, in four quasi-commandments: "1. Allow for lending by
non-banks. 2. Avoid setting interest rate caps too low. 3. Ensure minimum
Consensus-Guidelines-Guiding-Principles-on-Regulation-and-Supervision-of-Microfinance-
Jun-2003.pdf.
26 See PI SLICE, Microfinance, http://pi-slice.com/content.php?id=12 (last visited Oct.
25, 2012).
27 See BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, About BIS, http://www.bis.org/ about
/index.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 2012).
28 Bank For International Settlements, Consultative Document, Microfinance Activities
and the Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision, BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING
SUPERVISION (2010), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs167.pdf.
29 Denise Dias, Basel Blesses Microfinance, CGAP (Oct. 19, 2010), http://www.cgap.
orgfblog/basel-blesses-microfinance.
30 European Commission, Expert Report, The Regulation of Microcredit in Europe,
ENTERPRISE AND INDUSTRY (2007), http://ec.europa.eulenterprise /newsroom/ cfl_getdocu
ment.cfm?doc id=538.
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legislative standards for non-banks. 4. Create a favourable general
environment for microenterprise." 3 1
The nonprofit World Education Australia Limited, opining on
microfinance, has also adopted a quasi-commandments presentation. Its
2006 Principles of Sustainable Microfinance3 2 opts for eleven precepts
instead of four and for less specificity than what the European Commission
endorses. Among its Principles are generalizations like "Microfinance is a
powerful instrument against poverty" and "Microfinance means building
financial systems that serve the poor,"33 along with more specific stances:
World Education Australia Limited, like the European Commission,
perceives interest rate caps as detrimental;3 4 it recommends that
governments only enable, rather than provide, financial services.
4. Comprehensive National Laws
Legislation enacted around the world has undertaken to regulate
microfinance. The World Bank notes "legislation and regulation
initiatives" in South Africa, Zambia, Uganda, Malawi, Nepal, Bangladesh,
Bosnia, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine, all installed before 1999.36 More
recently, the Central Bank of Nigeria in 2011 updated its 2005
Microfinance Policy Framework for Nigeria; the Microfinance Act,
addressing deposit-taking institutions, brought comprehensive microfinance
regulation to Kenya;38 the government of Rwanda adopted a National
Microfinance Strategy;39 and draft legislation proposed to extend the reach
of the Reserve Bank of India over microfinance.4 0
31 Id. at 5.
32 WORLD EDUC. AUSTL., Principles for Sustainable Microfinance (2006), http://www.
mdf.org.rs/pdf/MF-Principles.pdf.
* Id. at 1-2.
3 Id. at 2.
1 Id. at 3.
36 van Greuning et al., Framework, supra note 20, at I n.3.
3 Central Bank of Nigeria, Microfinance Policy Framework for Nigeria (2011),
available at http://www.cenbank.org/Out/2011/pressrelease/gvd/Revised%2OMicrofinance
%20Policy/o2OJuly/o2012%202011 .pdf.
3 The Microfinance Act, No. 19 (2006), KENYA GAZETTE SUPPLEMENT No. 103 § §4-10,
available at http://www.idlo.int/MF/Documents/Regulations/KENYAl.pdf.
39 Thompson, supra note 2, at 426 (citing United Nations Development Programme &
Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, Republic of Rwanda, Building an Inclusive
Financial Sector in Rwanda 3 (2009), available at http://www.undp.org.rw/Prodoc_U
NCDF P73948.pdf).
40 The Micro Finance Institutions (Development and Regulation) Bill, Draft Legislation
(2011), available at http://financialservices.gov.in/banking/micro-finance-institution-bill
2011 .pdf. For an analysis of this draft statute, see Lamar Dowling, The Indian
9
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5. An Assessment
Disaggregation-the central notion of the first-published comprehensive
principles-was the right idea: on that point this Article builds on well-
grounded earlier work. The World Bank has long understood that
microfinance cannot be regulated in monolithic terms. Its careful
delineation of tiers and cohorts correctly focused on the activities of entities
rather than the still-new neologism. 4 1  Its prudential rules for banks
combined attention to safety in savings with the development goal of
expanding branch banking. Yet instead of providing the last word, the
Framework for Regulating Microfinance Institutions triggered new
proposals. Experts apparently read this compendium as a first draft.
If the World Bank had hoped for acceptance and implementation of its
ideas, in hindsight it harmed its chances when it gave its splitter rulebook a
lumper title.42 The term "microfinance," which the World Bank chose in
1999 when "microcredit" was still ascendant, may have made the
Framework appear modem, ahead of the jargon curve. Its unity
nevertheless undermined the drafters' thesis: Microfinance consists of
divergent activities, not just one, and is furnished by entities with different
priorities. An alternative title omitting the neologism-something like
"Classifications to Regulate Banking for the Poor," admittedly a duller
option-would have described the document more accurately. Even if it
had had a descriptively accurate title, however, the Framework would have
looked ripe for revision eight or nine years after its publication, when
observers started to ask whether better rules governing financial institutions
could have ameliorated a collapse.
B. Crises That Invite More Responses
The global financial crisis that began in 2007 marked a turn for
microfinance. Accounts of failures and alarms among microlending
institutions followed reports of setbacks in the financial sector generally.
The fall of microfinance in Andhra Pradesh, a state in central India that had
received large infusions of loan capital from both state and national
government sources and for-profit lenders doing business in the region,
Microfinance Institutions (Development and Regulation) Bill of 2011: Microfinance
Beginnings and Crisis and How the Indian Government is Trying to Protect Its People, 45
INT'L LAW. 1083 (2011).
41 Dividing providers into seven types within three categories made for a confusing
typology, however. See van Greuning et al., Framework, supra note 20, at ii.
42 See supra note 6 and accompanying text (contrasting lumpers with splitters).
10
2013 / REGULATING M7CROFINANCE
drew particular attention.43 Headlined as "India's Major Crisis in
Microlending,"" the Andhra Pradesh experience circa 2010 showcased the
fragility of banking for poor clients: calamities escalate.
Borrowers who defaulted on loans in Andhra Pradesh spurred more
defaults. Widespread defaulting goaded lenders to pursue loan repayment
more aggressively. Reports of suicides by borrowers fueled the perception
of a crisis, and a legislative response by the state government, subjecting
microfinance institutions to more scrutiny and limiting what these lenders
could do, struck observers as understandable but counterproductive.4 5
According to a publication by the Brooks World Poverty Institute at the
University of Manchester, inadequate regulatory mechanisms deserve much
of the blame for the Andhra Pradesh devastation.4 6
Accounts of microfinance failure in other nations during 2009 and 2010
gave further support to Microfinance Needs Regulation, as country after
country reported crises in the sector. The acronym PAR, counting the
percentage of a portfolio at risk, added a worrisome note to microfinance
jargon:47 When a large Moroccan microfinance institution announced in
June 2009 that it would merge with a rival bank its alarming PAR, more
than 30%, was part of the reason:48 "The global financial crisis [was] not to
blame," wrote one researcher; instead, microfinance failed in Morocco
because of oversupply, which in turn caused, inter alia, "lack of internal
controls, and substandard governance." 49 Defaults, informal bailouts, and
contraction of the microloan market in Bosnia during the same year spurred
43 See Dowling, supra note 40, at 1086-88.
4 Eric Bellman & Arlene Change, India's Major Crisis in Microlending, Wall St. J.,
Oct. 29, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527023043164045755806632948
461 00.html.
45 Anurag Priyadarshee & Asad K. Ghalib, Working Paper, The Andhra Pradesh
Microfinance Crisis in India: Manfestation, Causal Analysis, and Regulatory Response,
BROOKS WORLD POVERTY INST. 1, 8 (2011), http://www.bwpi.manchester.ac.uk/resources
/Working-Papers/bwpi-wp-1571 .pdf; Micro-Credit Ratings Int'l Ltd., MCRIL's Comments
on the Draft Microfinance Bill: A Major Step Forward for Financial Inclusion? 1 (2011),
http://www.m-cril.com/BackEnd/ModulesFiles/Publication/M-CRIL's-comments-on-the-
draft-Microfinance-Bill-July-2011 .pdf.
46 Priyadarshee & Ghalib, supra note 45.
47 PAR of more than 10% indicates a repayment crisis. See Greg Chen, Stephen
Rasmussen, & Xavier Reille, Growth and Vulnerabilities in Microfinance, CGAP 1, 4 (2010)
http://www.cgap.org/gm/document-1.9.42393/FN61.pdf.
48 Xavier Reille, The Rise, Fall, and Recovery of the Microfinance Sector in Morocco,
CGAP 1, 2 (2010), http://www.cgap.org/sites/default/files/CGAP-Brief-The-Rise-Fall-and-
Recovery-of-the-Microfinance-Sector-in-Morocco-Jan-201 0.pdf.
49 Id.
11
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commentary that inadequate regulation coupled with a surfeit of foreign-
originated cash had caused unsustainable lending.o
The experience of Nicaragua during this period pointed up another need
for regulation: microcredit can give rise to risky politics. 51  In 2008,
Movimiento No Pago revisited an old struggle between debtors and
creditors in a poverty-stricken nation when the mayor of Jalapa, a northern
town, delivered a fiery speech that urged farmers to stand up against
microfinance institutions to which they owed high-interest debt.5 2 Violence
ensued: protesters attempted to burn down the headquarters of a regional
microlender called La Fundaci6n para el Desarrollo de Nueva Segovia.53 "I
don't pay" soon morphed from slogan into political force in Nicaragua.
In 2010 the National Assembly acceded to several "no pago" demands,
including a cap on interest rates for new loans, a suspension of asset
seizures from delinquent borrowers and, central to the movement, what
became known as a moratorium, which gave debtors partial respite by
rewriting and amortizing loan terms. 54  Running for re-election to the
presidency in 2011, Daniel Ortega won backing from the movement when
he agreed that debtors ought to stand up to their microcreditors." Whether
Movimiento No Pago worsened-or instead merely accompanied, or
perhaps even eased--effects of the global downturn for Nicaraguans is
difficult to know, but credit became less available there after 2009. More
than 100,000 clients lost microcredit, and the nation's microloan portfolio
dropped from US $420 million in 2008 to $170 million in April 2011.56
50 William K. Black, Microcredit Accounting Control Fraud Deepens Bosnia's
Nightmare, NEW EcoN. PERSPECTIVES (Mar. 11, 2012, 10:23 PM), http://neweconomic
perspectives.org/2012/03/microcredit-accounting-control-fraud-deepens-bosnias-nightmare
.html.
s1 See Bhaskar Chakravorti, Does Microfinance Forestall Political Upheavals? Or
Does It Cause Them?, THE FLETCHER SCH. OF LAW AND DIPLOMACY (2010),
http://fletcher.tufts.edu/MIB/Ten-Questions/Q3-Microfinance (reporting an interview with
Kim Wilson concluding that in Nicaragua, microfinance "exacerbated an aggressive
platform that [Daniel Ortega's] political party already had").
52 Elizabeth Minchew, A Movement to Acknowledge: The Nicaraguan Movimiento No
Pago, MICROFINANCE Focus (Sept. 14, 2011), http://www.microfinancefocus.com/mov
ement-acknowledge-nicaraguan-movimiento-no-pago.
53 id.
54 Sergio Guzmin, Ley Moratoria (Moratorium Law) Passes in Nicaragua, CENTER FOR
FINANCIAL INCLUSION BLOG (Mar. 23, 2010), http://cfi-blog.org/2010/03/23/ley-moratoria-
moratorium-law-passes-in-nicaragua/.
5 David Roodman, Think Again: Microfinance, FOREIGN POLICY (Feb. 1, 2012),
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/02/01/think againmicrofinance?page=0,4.
See 6 Microfinance Crises That the Sector Does Not Want to Remember,
MICROFINANCE Focus (Apr. 22, 2011), http://www.microfinancefocus.com/6-microfinance-
crises-sector-does-not-want-remember.
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II. BUT WHAT IS MICROFINANCE? RECURRING CONFUSIONS
The regulation of microfinance has been confounded by three sources of
fragmentation and disarray. The first and most basic difficulty is the
absence of an accepted definition of the term. The second difficulty, three
conventional wisdoms that coexist in contradiction to one another,
destabilizes regulatory policy. The third difficulty is present in many
though not all microfinance offerings: "the double bottom line," a
sloganish goal that purports to favor simultaneous economic and social
returns. Though attractive to donors and investors, this constituent of
contemporary microfinance impedes coherence in regulation.
A. Definitional Uncertainty
Regulators who would write rules for microfinance need a working
definition of this newish word. The development sociologist Hans Dieter
Seibel has written that he invented "microfinance" in about 1990 to expand
"microcredit," an older term, into a broader set of financial services: he
was especially interested in microsavings." Because no other writers has
claimed to have coined "microfinance" and no printed instances of the term
predate the early 1990s, 58 we can start with what Seibel has said his noun
means.
To Seibel, microfinance is "that part of the financial sector which
comprises formal and informal financial institutions, small and large, that
provide small-size financial services to the poorer sections of the population
as well as larger-size financial services to agro-processing and other small
and medium rural enterprises." 59 Why Seibel includes "larger-size financial
services to agro-processing and other . . . rural enterprises" in his
understanding of the term is obscure, but the rest of his definition resembles
other attempts to say what microfinance is.60
5 Hans Dieter Seibel, Does History Matter? The Old and the New World ofMicrofinance
in Europe and Asia, UNIv. OF COLOGNE 1 n. 1 (2005), http://www.microfinancegateway.org/gm/
document-1.9.29698/29667_fileDoes HistoryMatter.pdf.
8 See generally MARGUERITE S. ROBINsON, THE MICROFINANCE REVOLUTION:
SUSTAINABLE FINANCE FOR THE POOR xxx (2001) (recounting that the author "first heard the
term microfinance revolution used .. . in 1993"); David Roodman, What is Microfinance?,
CTR. FOR GLOBAL DEv. (Oct. 11, 2010), http://blogs.cgdev.org/open book/20 10/10/what-is-
microfinance.php (examining the word along with predecessors like "microprocessor" and
"microenterprise").
5 Seibel, supra note 57, at 1 n. 1.
60 See, e.g., ROBINSON, supra note 58, at 9-10; What is Microfinance?, MICROFINANCE.
ORG, http://www.microfinancegateway.org/p/site/m/template.rc/1.26.12263/ (last visited
Oct. 27, 2012).
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None of these proffered definitions is clear enough to hold up a platform
of regulation.6 ' To illustrate the difficulty, consider the provisional
definition chosen by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision in 2009.
The Committee declared that microfinance is "the provision of financial
services in limited amounts to lower income households and small,
informal businesses."62 This definition appeared in a survey questionnaire
that the Committee distributed to supervisory authorities in thirty-two
countries. The Basel definition resembles Hans Dieter Seibel's
understanding of the word,63 but whereas Seibel had only described what
interested him as a researcher, the Basel survey had ambitions for
regulation. It set out to determine how well the Committee's established
Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision, originally published in
1997 and revised in 2006,6 apply to microfinance.s Its premise casts
microfinance as a subset of banking generally that might differ enough
from banking to warrant its own regulations.
With this divide in mind, drawing the line between microfinance and
banking becomes critical: and yet the Basel provisional definition of
microfinance avoids precision. What are "limited amounts"? Surely all
financial transfers have some limit. To qualify, must customers be
"households," or can individuals also participate in microfinance? How
low is "lower income"? Are "small, informal businesses" different from
small businesses and informal businesses?
Other instances of obscurity obstruct microfinance regulation. Some
published understandings of the word presume that a microloan or micro-
transfer supports entrepreneurial activity and others perceive it as coming to
the recipient with no inherent restrictions on use; some recognize
individuals as potential clients of microfinance while others insist that
microfinance is shared by groups of poor people; some focus on the intent
One authority on microfinance who pre-published a book in chapter-by-chapter posts
online stated the definitional problem forthrightly on his blog. "I'm seen as an expert on
microfinance," David Roodman wrote. "I'm writing a book about microfinance. I blog
about microfinance. I go to microfinance conferences. So you'd think I know what
microfinance is. But I'm not sure I do." Roodman, supra note 58. The book is DAVID
ROODMAN, DUE DILIGENCE: AN IMPERTINENT INQUIRY INTO MICROFINANCE (2012).
62 Bank For International Settlements, Microfinance activities and the Core Principles
for Effective Banking Supervision, BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION 1 (2010),
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsl75.pdf.
63 See supra text accompanying note 59.
6 Bank For International Settlements, Core Principles for Effective Banking
Supervision, BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION 1 (2006), http://www.bis.org
/publ/bcbsl29.pdf [hereinafter Basel Committee].
65 Id. at 34.
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of the provider; some associate microfinance with the amelioration of social
distress.
These divergent understandings and provisional definitions undermine
microfinance regulation by sowing uncertainty about the identity of
providers and clients, the transactions that fall under the aegis of a rule, and
the benefits or goals that the regulatory scheme seeks to advance.
Imprecision, self-refuting jargon, and inclusion of entities that may or may
not align with governing legal categories come together in a melange.
B. Conventional Wisdoms
Attitudes about microfinance as a tool for enhancing economic and social
development align with attitudes about its regulation. Three clusters of
conventional wisdom have emerged in contemporary discussion. The first
celebrates microfinance as a source of spontaneous wealth. Applied to
regulation, this stance worries that too many rules will impede innovation
and dampen the best hopes of the poor.6 ' The second genre harbors an
opposite worry, perceiving microfinance to be a source of dangerous debt,
deeper poverty, or even violent upheaval. It favors more controls.
Attempting to combine the optimism of the first with the pessimism of the
second, the third genre of conventional wisdom on microfinance finds
opportunity and danger combined. 8 The three genres swing in oscillation.
1. Optimism
Microfinance reached its apogee of prestige when Muhammad Yunus
and the bank he founded, Grameen, shared the Nobel Peace Prize in 2006.
The Norwegian Nobel Committee drew a novel connection between a for-
66 See generally Roodman, supra note 58 (reporting multiplicity).
67 See, e.g., Christen et al., supra note 25, at 4 (recommending "enabling" regulation to
encourage new entrants into the microfinance market); B. Seth McNew, Regulation and
Supervision of Microfinance Institutions: A Proposal for a Balanced Approach, 15 LAw. &
Bus. REv. AMERICAS 287, 288 (2009) (worrying that regulation of microfinance providers
"can easily become overbearing, and the cost of compliance may become so high as to
defeat the ultimate goal of . . . giving the world's poorest citizens access to financial
services.").
68 I advert to the orientalist notion that "crisis" in Chinese combines the ideograms for
danger and opportunity. See Cecil Adams, Is the Chinese Word for "Crisis" a Combination
of "Danger" and "Opportunity"? THE STRAIGHT DOPE (Nov. 3, 2000), http:/www.
straightdope.com/columns/read/2363/is-the-chinese-word-for-crisis-a-combination-of-
danger-and-opportunity (concluding that the suggestion is mostly inaccurate).
69 The Nobel Peace Prize for 2006, NOBELPRIZE.ORG (Oct. 13, 2006), http://www.nobel
prize.org/nobel prizes/peacelaureates/2006/press.html.
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profit bank and world peace when it linked microcredit with the aim of its
prize. "Lasting peace cannot be achieved," wrote the Committee, "unless
large population groups find ways in which to break out of poverty.
Microcredit is one such means."7 o
Microfinance had achieved acclaim before its 2006 triumph. Former
U.S. President Bill Clinton remarked in 2002 that Muhammad Yunus "long
ago should have won the Nobel Prize. I'll keep saying that until they
finally give it to him." 7' The Consultative Group to Assist the Poor was
formed in 1995 to expand access to financial services for so-called
"unbankable persons" everywhere in the world.72 In 2004, the United
Nations announced that 2005 would be the International Year of
Microcredit.73 Scholarship in the field took off with the publication of The
Microfinance Revolution,7 4 documenting and celebrating microfinance as
central to sustainable economic development.
For enthusiasts, microfinance has retained its 2006-vintage luster. When
in 2009 Muhammad Yunus won the Presidential Medal of Freedom, the
highest honor given to civilians in the United States, President Obama
praised his Grameen Bank for "lifting millions of people from poverty with
microloans."75 Researchers continue to report that this category of banking
builds wealth.76 Microlending not only ameliorates poverty and spurs
domestic economic development, the optimists declare, but also installs
70 Id.
71 William Jefferson Clinton, Former President of the United States, Speaker at the
University of California, Berkeley (Jan. 29, 2002) (transcript available at http://www.
berkeley.edu/news/features/2002/clinton/clinton-transcript.html).
72 Edward Bresnyan, Case Study, Addressing Challenges of Globalization: An
Independent Evaluation of the World Bank's Approach to Global Programs, THE WORLD
BANK OPERATIONS EVALUATION DEPARTMENT vii (2004), http://Inweb90.worldbank.org/oed
/oeddoclib.nsf/24cc3bblf94aellc85256808006a0046/c29f384f74e0ec5785256f240050d440
/$FILE/gpppcgapwp.pdf.
7 INTERNATIONAL YEAR OF MICROCREDIT 2005, http://www.un.org/events/microcredit/
(last visited Oct. 30, 2012).
74 ROBINSON, supra note 58; MARGUERITE S. ROBINsoN, THE MICROFINANCE
REvOLUTION, VOLUME II: LESSONS FROM INDONESIA (2002).
7s President Barack Obama, Remarks By President Obama At The Medal Of Freedom
Ceremony (Aug. 13, 2009) (transcript available at http://www.muhammadyunus.org/In-the-
Media/remarks-by-president-obama-at-the-medal-of-freedom-ceremony).
76 Alan M. White, Credit and Human Welfare: Lessons from Microcredit in Developing
Nations, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1093, 1095-96 (2012) (reporting on "[e]xtensive empirical
research"); Inter-American Development Bank, IDB Urges Microfinance Industry to Reach
Out to Millions of Underserved People in Latin America and the Caribbean, IADB.ORG
(Oct. 1, 2009), http://www.iadb.org/en/news/news-releases/2009-10-01/idb-urges-microfin
ance-industry-to-reach-out-to-millions-of-underserved-people-in-latin-america-and-the-
caribbean,5697.html.
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ancillary gains: it opens philanthropy to a wider circle of donors; 77 enhances
the education of youngsters in the United States;78 keeps poor families
together and helps prevent illegal border crossings;79 and eases the ravages
of malnutrition.80 The Nobel Peace Prize citation praised microlending for
making women better off;81 numerous writers agree. 82
The global financial crisis presented a challenge to optimism about
microfinance that enthusiasts have found sobering but not daunting. If
microfinance ameliorates poverty, then by hypothesis a world grown poorer
following economic collapse needs more of it. Because loan capital
becomes less available in a contracted economy, policymakers can ease the
downturn by making lending and borrowing more available. Poorer
borrowers benefit from lower interest rates; increases in supply lower
prices; accordingly, the optimist prescription urges policymakers to invite
more providers into the microloan market.83
n Tracy Turner, Planting Seeds ofHope, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Apr. 13, 2007, at 1 F.
78 Sacha Pfeiffer, Tale of Microloans Urges Kids to Generosity, THE BOSTON GLOBE,
Mar. 10, 2008, at ID.
7 Devon Roepcke, "Should I Stay or Should I Go? ": Preventing Illegal Immigration By
Creating Opportunity in Mexico Through Microcredit Lending, 38 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 455,
460 (2008); Lourdes Medrano, Micro-lending Efforts in Mexico Helps Poor Families Stay
Home, Ariz. Daily Star, June 17, 2007, at Al.
80 Jessica Deihl, Microfinance in Emerging Markets: The Effects of the Current
Economic Crisis and the Role of Securitization, 6 AM. U. WASH. C. Bus. L. BRIEF 37, 38-39
(2009), available at http://www.wcl.american.edu/blr/documents/Spring09Microfinance.
pdf (reporting a study in Bangladesh).
81 See source cited supra note 69.
82 See Susy Cheston & Lisa Kuhn, Empowering Women through Microfinance,
MICROCREDIT SUMMIT CAMPAIGN (2002), http://www.microcreditsummit.org/papers/empow
erment.pdf (summarizing benefits); see also Anita Bernstein, Pecuniary Reparations
Following National Crisis: A Convergence of Tort Theory, Microfinance, and Gender
Equality, 31 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 1, 31 (2009) (noting praise for microcredit as a feminist
instrument). Studies consistently report that female microborrowers are more likely than
non-borrowers to practice contraception. Charlotte E. Lott Why Women Matter: The Story
of Microcredit, 27 U. PITT. J. L. & COM 219, 227 (2009) (summarizing findings). See
generally Salil Tripathi, Microcredit Won't Make Poverty History, GUARDIAN (Oct. 17,
2006), http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2006/oct/17/businesscomment.internationalaid
anddevelopment?INTCMP=SRCH (arguing that "to appreciate Grameen's real worth, we
need to look at its role in empowering women. That is its real success, and for achieving this
in a conservative, largely rural society such as Bangladesh, where Islamic fundamentalism is
on the rise, Dr. Yunus deserves his Nobel prize.").
83 See, e.g., Michael Schlein & Michael Chu, Microfinance Goes Public, FORBES.COM
(Apr. 30, 2010, 5:40 AM), http://www.forbes.com/2010/04/30/india-microfinance-sks-ipo-
markets-emerging-markets-accion.html (praising IPOs for microfinance institutions as a
source of wealth).
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2. Pessimism
"The idea of borrowing one's way out of poverty is passing strange,"
mused Judge Richard Posner in 2005,8 joining a cohort of skeptics who
expressed doubts well before the twenty-first century's first global
downturn. Borrowing in contrast to saving-or microcredit in contrast to
microfinance-has received the brunt of criticism. One careful review of
published studies circa 2002 found microcredit no better than "other
poverty alleviation models. Providing money to a population through
almost any means will ordinarily have a short-term positive impact on
poverty[J" but the effect dissipates "once the funds are expended."85 Other
pre-downturn skeptics argued that microlending benefits only the richer
poor,86 that enthusiasts have overstated gains to women from
microlending, 87 and that microcredit is best understood as a salve that eases
the pain of "trade liberalization, deregulation and privatization" imposed on
the world's poor by foreign intervenors.
A global financial crisis that reached full force only two years after
Yunus and his bank shared the Nobel Prize strengthened a view among
pessimists, parallel to that of optimists, 8 9 that they had been right all along.
Critics who had spoken against microcredit before 2007 returned with more
ammunition.90 Whereas earlier objections had taken a mild tone-mostly
84 See Bernstein & Seibel, supra note 18, at 89 n.71.
85 Celia R. Taylor, Microcredit as Model: A Critique of State/NGO Relations, 29
SYRACUSE. J. INT'L L. & CoM. 303, 326 (2002).
86 Thomas Dichter, Hype and Hope: The Worrisome State of the Microcredit Movement,
MICROFINANCE GATEWAY (Mar. 24, 2006), http://www.microfinancegateway.org/p/site/m//
template.re/1.26.9051 ("The microcredit paradox is that the poorest people can do little
productive with the credit, and the ones who can do the most with it are those who don't
really need microcredit, but larger amounts with different (often longer) credit terms.").
87 Dyal-Chand, supra note 18, at 221 (objecting to the Grameen mode of collecting on
its loans); Gina Neff, Microcredit, Microresults, 74 LEFT Bus. OBSERVER 1, 4-5 (1996),
available at http://www.leftbusinessobserver.com/Micro.html (criticizing microcredit
programs for encouraging borrowers to compete only with other women in low-wage
entrepreneurial dead ends).
88 Walden Bello, Microcredit, Macro Issues, THE NATION, Oct. 30, 2006,
http://www.thenation.com/article/microcredit-macro-issues (referencing the World Bank).
89 See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
90 See, e.g., THOMAS W. DICHTER, WHAT'S WRONG WITH MICROFINANCE? (2007);
Thomas W. Dichter, Too Good to Be True, 32 HARV. INT'L REV. (May 1, 2010), available at
http://hir.barvard.edulwomen-in-power/too-good-to-be-true; MILFORD BATEMAN, WHY
DOESN'T MICROFINANCE WORK? THE DESTRUCTIVE RISE OF LOCAL NEOLIBERALISM (2010)
(describing microfinance as advantageous to investors and international standard-setters).
On doubts about microfinance in the context of trafficking, see Katherine Driscoll,
Microcredit: Not Yet a Panacea to End Trafficking in Women, 13 U. PA. J. Bus. L. 275, 287
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just skeptical that loans cure poverty and suggesting that claims of big
effects were exaggerated-post-downturn critiques have found malfeasance
in microfinance.91 In this perspective, choices like awarding a big prize to a
bank and declaring a calendar year of microcredit were not mere judgment-
calls akin to admiring celebrities more than they deserve: they generated
new harms.
Prestige from the 2006 award directly preceded the initial public offering
of the controversial microfinance institution Banco Comparatamos in
Mexico in 2007, a launch that drew more than a billion United States
dollars in market capitalization on its closing date.92 Boosterish books
published in 2005 and 2006 that bore optimistic titles-Untapped, Make
Poverty Business, The 86% Solution, The Fortune at the Bottom of the
Pyramid-preached microfinance as a tool for anyone, rich or poor, to gain
wealth.9 3 Because loans are more profitable than savings, 94 it is likely that
that touting microfinance encouraged wealth-pursuers, providers and
customers alike, to accrete unsustainable levels of debt. Increased
economic vulnerability also makes it easier for lenders to get away with
overcharging and otherwise injuring poor borrowers. 95
(2010), available at https://www.law.upenn.edu/journals/jbl/articles/volumel3/issuel/Dri
scolll3UPa.JBus.L.275%o282010o29.pdf See also Rebecca Farrer, Exploring the Human
Rights Implications of Microfinance Initiatives, 36 INT'L J. LEGAL INFO. 447, 459 (2008)
(reporting that women with HIV may be especially ill served by group-loan models of
microfinance) (citations omitted).
91 See, e.g., HUGH SINCLAIR, CONFESSIONS OF A MICROFINANCE HERETIC: How
MICROLENDING LOST ITS WAY AND BETRAYED THE POOR (2012) (arguing that microfinance
rapidly became a locus of gouging by commercial banks); BATEMAN, supra note 90.
92 See Dragan Loncar, Christian Novak & Svetlana Cicmil, Global Recession and
Sustainable Development: The Case of Microfinance Industry in Eastern Europe,
MICROFINANCEGATEWAY.ORG (Sept. 2009), http://www.microfinancegateway.org/gm/
document-1.9.39138/MICROFINANCE%20PAPER-%20FINAL%20VERSION.pdf
(finding a connection between the two).
93 Aneel Karnani, Romanticizing the Poor, 7 STAN. Soc. INNOVATION REv. 38 (2009),
http://www.ssireview.org/pdf/RomaticizingthePoor.pdf
9 See infra Part Ill.
95 Sebastian Strangio, Is Microfinance Pushing the World's Poorest Even Deeper Into
Poverty?, THE NEW REPUBLIC (Dec. 14, 2011, 12:00 AM), http://www.tnr.com/article
/world/98499/microfinance-drive-poverty (quoting an activist based in Dhaka: "Microcredit
is discrimination against the poor, it doesn't empower. It's total nonsense."); Devinder
Sharma, Micro-finance Institutions on a Looting Spree: Making Profits From Poverty,
GROUND REALITY (Nov. 25, 2009, 11:52 AM), http://devinder-sharma.blogspot.com/2009
/11/micro-finance-institutions-on-looting.html ("All that micro-finance institutions are doing
now is [replacing] moneylenders. Micro-finance institutions are also extracting their pound
of flesh.").
A milder expression of pessimism notes that microfinance appears neither necessary
nor sufficient for the economic advancement of a nation. Anne Welle-Strand, Kristian
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3. Seeking the Center
Valuable writings on microfinance have eschewed the extremes of
cheerleading at one end and fretting at the other. These works include a
celebrated book published in stages on the Internet, with opportunities for
readers to weigh in on draft chapters;96 explanations of how difficult it is to
know whether microfinance initiatives have any effect and reviewing the
small set of controlled studies;97 and distinctions between microsavings and
microcredit, the former type of microfinance being safer and more
necessary. 98  These publications work in a middle ground that is different
from a stance we may call centrism, which aspires to a middling level of
enthusiasm for microfinance.
After optimists documented the problem of poor people cut off from
access to banks and pessimists focused on various adverse consequences
associated with microfinance, this hope for synthesis started to manifest in
generalizations about microfinance in around 2009. Expand but add
safeguards, said the newest conventional wisdom. Make more loans, but
worry about abuses. Temper pessimism with optimism and optimism with
pessimism.99
Two difficulties with centrism are pertinent to the challenge of regulating
microfinance. First, there is no a priori reason to suppose that correctness
necessarily lies midway between two policy positions perceived as polar
Kjollesdal, & Nick Sitter, Assessing Microfinance: The Bosnia and Herzegovina Case, 8
MANAGING GLOBAL TRANSITIONS 145, 150-51 (2010) (noting that Vietnam and South Korea
made significant economic progress with little microfinance, while Bangladesh, Bolivia, and
Indonesia, which experienced an "influx of microcredit," fared worse at alleviating poverty)
(citation omitted).
96 ROODMAN, supra note 61.
9 A Partial Marvel: Microcredit May Not Work Wonders But It Does Help The
Entrepreneurial Poor, THE EcoNOMIST (July 16, 2009), http://www.economist.com/node/
14031284?story id=14031284; Robin G. Isserles, Microcredit: The Rhetoric of
Empowerment, the Reality of "Development as Usual," 31 WOMEN'S STUD. Q. 38 (2003).
98 The Yale University economist Dean Karlan, acclaimed for empirical work on the
effects of microfinance, told a journalist that concerns about "irrational exuberance" with
respect to borrowing should not obscure the need to expand microsavings. See Strangio,
supra note 95.
99 See, e.g., VIKRAM AKULA, A FISTFUL OF RICE: MY UNEXPECTED QUEST TO END
POVERTY THROUGH PROFITABILTY (2010) (defending for-profit microlending while
condemning microlenders that charge the maximum interest rates that loan markets will
bear); Beatriz Armendiriz & Marc Labie, Introduction and Overview: An Inquiry Into the
Mismatch in Microfinance, in THE HANDBOOK OF MICROFINANCE 3 (Beatriz Armenddriz &
Marc Labie eds., 2011) ("Microfinance . . . is seen by some as a magic wand against poverty
that is supposed to solve it all. For others, microfinance is no more than a new wave of
usurious practices reframed and glorified.").
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opposites.'00 The optimistic and the pessimistic view of microfinance could
each be wrong in the sense of not going far enough, rather than going too
far. Diluting one with the other would yield worse results than would
hewing to the (correct) extreme. Second, neither in isolation nor as
constituents of a dialectic do optimistic or pessimistic perspectives on
microfinance answer the questions of which microfinance rules are best and
whether regulation ought to discourage or encourage particular financial
practices.
Debates about microfinance return to the oscillation between exuberance
and worry found in debates about what might be called macrofinance, the
larger environment of domestic and transnational consumer banking.
Good-faith disagreement about consumer-finance regulation (good-faith,
that is, in the sense of disinterested pursuit of socially optimal rules rather
than a quest for personal or political advantage)' 0 ' has also shuttled between
laissez-faire and sterner controls. Leaving the market alone seems like a
good idea until defaults and insolvencies mount. Regulating tightly seems
like a good idea until lack of access to capital appears to oppress providers
or customers. Centrism between optimism and pessimism seems like a
good idea until constituencies demand to know what exactly the rules are
trying to install while partisans of the polar stances-laissez-faire or sterner
controls-perceive any middle ground as misguided appeasement. The
problem of warring ideological cohorts is thus familiar from the larger
debate about financial regulation.
In microfinance the problem has worse effects because comprehensive
proposals to regulate microfinance are formed at a maximum distance from
clients. Consumer banking in the United States may suffer from regulatory
capture, excess influence by banks over Congress and state governments, or
inadequate enforcement of existing regulation, but at least rule-writers live
in the same country as consumers and thus face some accountability. Best-
practices statements about microfinance of the CGAP or Basel stripe get
written by remotely situated researchers who do not suffer when their
recommendations fail. These authors might be disinterested in the
research-centered sense of the adjectives "neutral" or "impartial"; but
whereas disinterestedness is good for the assessment of interventions, it can
make proffered new rules worse when it insulates initiators from
consequences.
'00 BO BENNETT, LOGICALLY FALLACIOUS: THE ULTIMATE COLLECTION OF OVER 300
LOGICAL FALLACIES (2012) (identifying the argument to moderation or argumentum ad
temperantiam as synonymous with "middle ground, false compromise, gray fallacy, golden
mean fallacy, fallacy of the mean, [and] splitting the difference").
101 See supra note 8.
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Comprehensive national legislation avoids this infirmity because
codifiers live with what they promulgate. Yet by addressing
"microfinance" rather than financial institutions, these statutes exempt the
middle-income and wealthy citizenry from what the rules deliver.
Experiences with federal transfer payments in the United States-Medicare
and Social Security for citizens in the mainstream and "welfare" and food
stamps for the marginalized poor-point up the danger of stigma and
isolation raised by provisions that affect only the very poor.10 2  Once
"microfinance" sticks as a label, this segment of consumer credit becomes a
regulatory ghetto, outside the mainstream.
The lack of consequences for prosperous stakeholders makes
microfinance more vulnerable to variations in exuberance and worry.
Centrism also fails to mitigate extreme shifts because of the same problem:
a gap between the prescribers and the prescribed-to. Separated from
effects, centrist observers add mainly dilution and vagueness to a policy
debate.
In sum, because regulators who draft provisions about microfinance live
far from the results of their efforts, the tempering effects of lived
experience are less available to ease the ideological extremes of optimism
and pessimism and what may be the thoughtless compromises of centrism.
For rule-writers who join the optimistic, pessimistic, or centrist teams,
microfinance offers a playing field for predilections and ideologies. This
distance helps to explain the proliferation of microfinance principles and
compendia: the powerlessness that accompanies poverty means that people
at risk of harm from interventions cannot silence an intervenor. Nor do
they have much voice in the debate. In sectors of the consumer-credit
economy that reach the middle class (credit cards, automobile financing),
reformers would be more inhibited by modesty. Optimists, pessimists, and
centrists who would normally have to negotiate with and learn from one
another in ideological competition can remain separated when opining on
microfinance. Relatively marginal perspectives face low barriers to
entry. 0 3 Diversity in ideas may make for lively reading, but regulation that
can be enacted and enforced needs a foundation in politics on the ground.
102 See generally Jennifer Stuber & Mark Schlesinger, Sources of Stigma for Means-
Tested Government Programs, 63 Soc. SCI. & MED. 933 (2006) (noting an association
between means-testing and stigma in U.S. transfer programs).
103 The large majority of what is written about microfinance gets published only online.
Peer review, editorial oversight, and the market of consumers who pay for what they read all
hold relatively little sway in policy debates.
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C. The Oxymoron ofa "Double Bottom Line"
Like "microfinance" itself, "the double bottom line" makes a useful point
at the expense of clarity and coherence. This coinage refers to
simultaneous pursuit by an entity of pecuniary earnings and social
enhancements.' Terms like "social entrepreneurship" for newly formed,
progress-minded entities and "cause marketing" for commercial promotions
that promise to give returns to charity illustrate the double bottom line as
propounded by for-profit businesses. 05
Microfinance entities-banks and charities alike-have expressed
fondness for this dual pursuit, emphasizing the microcredit subset of
microfinance.'06 The notion that small loans to poor borrowers yield both
earnings for the lender and gains for the nearby community is foundational
to contemporary microfinance. It underlay the Nobel Peace Prize award
divided in 2006 between a bank founder and the entity he started.107 The
two bottom lines really do have ground in common. Pecuniary earnings
and social enhancements overlap whenever gains in wealth support positive
cultural change in a community. As one scholar has argued, the two
priorities come together in "microfinance organizations that affirmatively
seek to change culturally-based attitudes that are antithetical to broad
development principles." 0 8
Few would quarrel with doing good while doing well, and the truism that
human actors pursue more than one goal at a time is not the problem with
the double bottom line. The difficulty lies in an implicit commitment to
precision that cannot be achieved. Traditional for-profit ledgers measure
the financial side of a bottom line relatively easily by subtracting costs from
revenues. The social-enhancement ledger is less amenable to
quantification.
Measurement technologies do exist, to be sure. In her strong defense of
social entrepreneurship, approving of undertakings by for-profit businesses
to "harness[] innovation, people, and resources to develop an enterprise that
10 Jerr Boschee, Doing Good While Doing Well, PIr. POST-GAZETTE, Oct. 19, 2008, at
Gl.
105 Brakman Reiser, supra note 11, at 34-41.
106 See Drew Tulchin, Microfinance's Double Bottom Line: Measuring Social Return for
the Microfinance Industry, SOCIAL ENTERPRISE ASSOCIATES 7 (2003), http://www.micro
financegateway.org/gm/document-1.9.27273/13947_13947.pdf ("Effectively gauging and
then reporting financial and social activities-managing both as the Double Bottom Line
(DBL)-positions microfinance institutions as a solution. Few fields in development or
commerce emphasize both economic and social performance as strongly as microfinance.")
(emphasis in original).
107 See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
108 Cao, supra note 9, at 988.
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is self-sustaining, makes money, and solves a social problem,"109 Janet Kerr
surveys the tools that can gauge social impact and finds them bounteous.
Innovators, she notes, have come up with taxonomies of metrics, guidelines
that a board of directors can apply to the socially minded entity it governs,
and a framework for managers to use while pursuing social
entrepreneurship." 0 It would no longer be fair to ascribe feel-good vacuity
to the social half of the double bottom line now that experts have applied
themselves to the task of measurement. Nevertheless, to date "no universal
standard""' has emerged to gauge the social profit (or loss) of a double-
bottom-line venture.
"The double bottom line" must remain an oxymoron. Even if
measurements should improve to the point of consensus about how to
quantify the social gains of an entity, a bottom line tolerates no bifurcation.
It announces finality. For any enterprise there can be only one. Accounting
standards may in the future evolve to measure the sustainability or social
enhancements achieved by a for-profit business, and also to recognize that
gains at one side of the ledger do not necessarily come at the expense of the
other;" 2 but it is hard to imagine how any measure might frame one
conclusion about corporate health that matters just as much as a separate
conclusion. Metrics amenable to counting social gains-which have not
yet taken hold-necessarily differ from the ones that count pecuniary profit.
They do not lie on the same axis.
III. DISAGGREGATION, FIRST PASS: MICROFINANCE AS
BANKING FOR POOR PEOPLE
Replacing "microfinance" with "banking for poor people" as an object of
regulatory attention advances at least three ends. First, it disaggregates a
dense Latinate term into pertinent constituents. Second, it makes the
regulatory effort simpler and more intelligible. Third, it puts a vulnerable
sector into the foreground for regulators.
As a label, "microfinance" distracts from the work of identifying risks,
activities, and participants in the sector they are addressing. This Part
substitutes a cumbersome phrase-"banking for poor people"-precisely
because this alternative is too clunky to become jargon. "Banking for poor
109 Janet E. Kerr, Sustainability Meets Profitability: The Convenient Truth of How the
Business Judgment Rule Protects a Board's Decision to Engage in Social Entrepreneurship,
29 CARDozo L. REv. 623, 633 (2007).
110 Id. at 644-53.
"' Tulchin, supra note 106, at 7.
112 Kerr, supra note 109.
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people" also aids the task of disaggregation by inviting regulators to think
about demand for, not just the supply of, the services they oversee.'1 3 One
noun in the phrase refers to providers and the other to customers.
After "banking for poor people" becomes the object of regulatory effort,
the desirability of simplicity becomes more apparent. Complexity is of
course hard to avoid in rules governing banking. Other things being equal,
however, these rules function better when they are relatively easy to
follow.114 At least at the preliminary level where this Article makes its
recommendations, opportunities for more clarity emerge through inquiry
into what customers want from banking for poor people.
Researchers know the answer. Foremost, poor people want a safe place
to store their money." 5 They also want access to credit.
A. Support For Savings
"Portfolios of the poor," a jocular-sounding title of a book whose point is
not facetious,' notes the near ubiquity of private property. Although
millions of people in the world are poor, few adults possess nothing. What
the poor categorically lack are secure places to store what they own, and
when surveyed they rank this need above others."' 7  Savings that can be
kept relatively safe can smooth fluctuations in income, provide continuity
during emergencies or occasions of new opportunity, and allow individuals
to share life-cycle events like funerals and weddings in their communities.
People need credit only some of the time, savings all of the time."'
The global downturn that began in 2008, reckoning with loan money
gone bad, harmed the relative prestige of microcredit within microfinance.
Donors and governments turned their attention away from debt and toward
savings. In early 2010, the Gates Foundation announced a $38 million
initiative to promote savings in 18 microfinance institutions." 9 In 2012
"3 See infra Part III.B.2.
114 Joe Nocera, The Simplicity Solution, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2012, at A23 (applying this
generalization to financial regulation).
1s ROBINSON, supra note 58.
116 DARYL COLLINS ET AL., PORTFOLIOS OF THE POOR: How THE WORLD'S POOR LIVE ON
$2 A DAY (2009).
"n Joshua Haynes & Mariah Levin, Debating the Future ofSavings-Led Microfinance: A
Summary Paper of the Microfinance From Below Conference (2009), http://fletcher
.tufts.edu/CEME/research/-/media/Fletcher/Microsites/CEME/newpdfs/CEMEMFSavings
ConferenceReport 03-2009.ashx (referencing the research of Marguerite S. Robinson).
"' Marguerite Robinson & Graham A.N. Wright, Mobilising Savings, in SAVINGS-AN
ESSENTIAL SERVICE FOR THE POOR 25, 26 (2009), http://www.microsave.org/sites/files/
technicalBriefs/briefingNotes/Savings Booklet.pdf.
I19 A Better Mattress: Microfinance Focuses On Lending. Now The Industry Is Turning
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Oxfam, the British charity, declared on its blog: "Forget microcredit:
microsavings work much better," going on to describe the operations of its
initiative Savings for Change. 120
Regulators thus have an array of proposals, experiences, and pilot
programs to draw on as they consider what to support through rule-based
facilitating. Although challenges to safe savings will vary from region to
region, a few points of common concern recur and provide a starting point
for savings reform. Like other recommendations in this Article, savings-
supportive regulatory priorities can be pursued and implemented without
use of the word microfinance.
1. Reconsidering Prudential Rules
Financial institutions that seek to take deposits must comply with
regulations focused on whether capital reserves are secure enough to let
customers withdraw money at will. This posture regards deposit-taking as
riskier than loan-making, and prudential regulation thus burdens savings
banks more than lenders that dispense microcredit. This attention to safety
is incomplete. Institutions that meet prudential standards are less likely to
fail than those that do not, but when poor people face the danger of having
no savings bank at all, aggregate-level safety diminishes.
Addressing this problem, reformers have offered suggestions to lower
cash-reserve minimums to qualify for a bank charter while keeping savings
accounts secure enough for poor customers.' 2 ' The tradeoff is perilous-at
the prudential level it treats poor depositors worse than prosperous ones-
yet it warrants consideration as a source of welfare for a vulnerable cohort.
At a minimum, rule-writers ought to ask whether existing prudential rules
have made low-income prospective depositors better or worse off.
2. Linkages
Foreclosed from institutional accounts to hold their cash deposits, the
unbankable poor resort to self-help, which at its most sophisticated takes
the form of group-based saving. Unbankable persons who unite in these
alliances know what they are missing: "security, convenience, liquidity,
access to loans, choice of demand driven products, helpful and respectful
To Deposits, THE ECONOMIST (Mar. 11, 2010), http://www.economist.com/node/15663834
[hereinafter A Better Mattress].
120 Duncan Green, Forget Microcredit: Microsavings Work Much Better, OXFAM (Apr.
5, 2012, 9:12 AM), http://www.oxfamblogs.org/fp2p/?p-9489.
121 See McNew, supra note 67, at 288 (noting the tradeoff); Bernstein & Seibel, supra
note 18, at 83-84 (noting recommendations made by the Alliance for Financial Inclusion).
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service, confidentiality, and returns," reported Marguerite Robinson, author
of The Microfinance Revolution, summarizing her field work.1 22 "None of
us wants to bank with groups," researcher Malcolm Harper has noted
wryly, "but we are happy to promote that the poor should use them
forever."l 23
Linkage banking presents a partial solution to this fragility by enhancing
connections between group-based savings and rotating credit associations
and formal institutions. Pioneer initiatives, installed first in Indonesia and
later in India, invented linkage banking when they identified small groups
of savers (twenty or fewer people, predominantly women, in both countries)
and helped them connect with banks, usually delivering advice as well as
accounts in the name of the group. 124 Linkage banking in India, where
these clusters of customers are called "self-help groups," has fostered
microcredit incidentally while emphasizing microsavings.12 5 Researchers
studying India report positive economic effects.12 6 To the extent that self-
help groups have fared worse since the global downturn,127 these
consequences originate in loans rather than savings; linkage banking
remains promising as a source of enhanced savings.
Access to formal institutions increases the prospects of poor savers to
earn interest on their money, reach additional capital in the form of credit,
and gain formal legal protection of their holdings.2 8 What regulators can
do to support linkage banking ranges from engagement by a large national
bank with or without the mediation of nonprofit organizations, as in India,
to more modest innovations. For example, bank rules could be amended to
permit a wider range of names ofi the account.
3. New Types of Savings Accounts
Lack of access to bank accounts is the major impediment to safe savings
for the poor, but other obstacles diminish the quantity of money held by
low-income depositors in banks. The poor are by hypothesis short of cash.
Saving money precludes spending it, and so any commitment individuals
may have to save their money means a reduction in whatever utility they
obtain from consumption. The pleasure of corruption can be short-lived.
122 See Haynes & Levin, supra note 117, at 3.
123 id.
124 Bernstein & Seibel, supra note 18, at 83-84.
125 id.
126 Id. at 84 (reporting on findings by Seibel and the central bank of India).
127 See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text (noting the local collapse of
microlending in 2010).
128 See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
27
University ofHawai'i Law Review / Vol. 35:1
Tempted to spend money that they could otherwise deposit in the bank
accounts they have, people might not save as much as they think they want
to. That individuals desire to prevent themselves from consuming their
spare cash is manifested by the popularity of voluntary barriers to
spending. 12 9
Depositors voluntarily accept-and even pay for-"commitment savings
products" that make their holdings less liquid. This category offers options
that bank regulators could encourage in an effort to enhance safe savings.13 0
A review financed by the Asian Development Bank examined schemes that
have been tried and show promise. Some of the constraints that were
studied force deposits; others inhibit withdrawals. On the forced-deposit
side, automatic transfers into investment accounts and automatic
withholding from paychecks offer promise mainly to the relatively rich
poor in prosperous countries. Other practices-such as bonuses awarded
by financial institutions for saving, deposit collectors, and commitment-
savings schemes for farmers-can benefit the relatively poor poor.131
Restricted-use savings accounts, restricted timing of withdrawals, a (literal)
lock box that holds cash, withdrawal fees, and peer monitoring are among
the examples of schemes focused on the withdrawal side of commitment
savings. 132
4. Reaching Poor Depositors Where They Live and Work
Geographic distances impede the access poor people might otherwise
have to banks. Technology looks like a fix. "Much of the current buzz,"
remarks a 2008 report on what CGAP has called transformational
branchless banking, "is around mobile phones,"l 33 of which several billion
129 Nava Ashraf, Nathalie Gons, Dean Karlan & Wesley Yin, A Review of Commitment
Savings Products in Developing Countries, THE FINANCIAL ACCESS INITIATIVE AND
INNOVATIONS FOR POVERTY ACTION 4-5 (2003), http://financialaccess.org/sites/default/
files/publications/a-review-of-commitment-savings-products-in-developing-countries.pdf
(noting, inter alia, the choice of U.S. taxpayers to overwithhold the income tax they owe to
get a larger refund; the high proportion of U.S. wealth held in illiquid assets, and the
willingness of individuals to accept inconveniences for the purpose of generating more
savings).
130 Id.
131 Id. at 5-8.
133 Timothy R. Lyman, Mark Pickens & David Porteous, Regulating Transformational
Branchless Banking: Mobile Phones and Other Technology to Increase Access to Finance,
CGAP (Jan. 15, 2008), http://www.cgap.org/publications/regulating-transformational-branch
less-banking-mobile-phones-and-other-technology.
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are in use around the world.13 4 The director of a Gates Foundation initiative
aimed at enhancing financial access has argued that mobile phones and
retail storefronts can combine as instruments for making savings more
available to poor depositors, who can use their telephones to order
transactions and familiar retail venues to pick up and leave their money. 135
Inviting banks to reach low-income prospective savers with partnerships
between mobile communication technology and retail agents necessarily
reaches into several regulatory domains. Rules pertaining to
telecommunication, competition, and consumer protection bear on
feasibility. At the banking level, implementation of such a proposal
necessarily touches on foreign exchange regulations, e-commerce rules, and
provisions governing whether and how a bank's agent can work with
customers at retail storefronts.136 Regulators must also consider how to
count, for the sake of prudential-rules compliance, sums in accounts that are
available to depositors by electronic means.137
B. Enhanced Lending
The downturn that had spread through the world by 2008 showcased both
the presence and the absence of loan regulations. The American statutory
response to this crisis, named Dodd-Frank for two committee chairmen in
Congress and tellingly subtitled the Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act,13 1 covered most of the United States income spectrum. At
the richer end, hedge funds, private equity funds, derivatives, investment
banks, and other aggregations of wealth on Wall Street faced controls the
likes of which had not been introduced since the Great Depression.1 39 At
the poorer end, Congress bestowed power over consumer-finance
fundamentals on a new Consumer Financial Protection Agency. 40 Similar
134 See Gartner Says Worldwide Mobile Connections Will Reach 5.6 Billion in 2011 As
Mobile Data Services Revenue Totals $314.7 Billion, GARTNER NEWSROOM (Aug. 4, 2011),
http://www.gartner.com/it/page.jsp?id=1759714 (estimating 5.6 billion mobile connections
worldwide in 2011).
13 A Better Mattress, supra note 119 (quoting Robert Peck Christen).
136 Lyman, Pickens & Porteous, supra note 133, at 5.
137 Id.
' Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
124 Stat. 1376 (2010). Christopher Dodd chaired the Senate Banking Committee and
Barney Frank chaired the House Financial Services Committee. Jim Hawkins, Regulating
on the Fringe: Reexamining the Link Between Fringe Banking and Financial Distress, 86
IND. L.J. 1361, 1380 n.100 (2011).
1 Michael S. Barr, The Financial Crisis and the Path ofReform, 29 YALE J. ON REG. 91,
113(2012).
140 See id. (summarizing Dodd-Frank).
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interventions arose outside the United States. The European Union moved
in 2009 to centralize regulation of banking, securities, and the insurance
sector, 14 1 while supranational entities took steps to strengthen prudential
regulation.14 2
Re-regulating has proceeded. Going forward, the substitution of
"banking for poor people" for "microfinance" would keep both customers
and providers at the forefront of new lending controls. Consumer
protection ought to be a priority for the regulation of loans made to low-
income borrowers. Another priority, this one focusing on providers, is to
optimize levels of loan capital.
1. Consumer Protection
Two ideas warrant attention in any discussion of consumer protection in
microlending because they so pervade the literature on financial regulatory
reform. The first is transparency: Advocates argue that consumers should
receive intelligible accounts of how much they are borrowing, how much
they will have to repay, how loans available in the borrowers' markets
compare to one another, and the consequences of not repaying.14 3  The
second oft-proposed reform is a maximum interest rate. 14 4 Both ideas have
promise and both call for caution before implementation.
Transparency offers something for two conflicting sectors in the
politically binary debate, pro versus contra, on regulation. Because clarity
about loan terms makes no sense unless borrowers can use disclosures to
guide their decisions, transparency as policy necessarily embraces and
extends consumer choice. This stance appeals to both admirers and
opponents of regulation, the optimists and pessimists we met in the last
Part. Pessimists appreciate transparency as a source of power for weaker
parties. For optimists, transparency supports an attractive alternative to
141 Ian Traynor, European Union Agrees Super-Regulator to Head Off Financial Crises,
THE GUARDIAN, Dec. 2, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.ukIbusiness/2009/dec/02/eu-
financial-regulation-deal.
142 Kevin Davis, Regulatory Reform Post the Global Financial Crisis: An Overview,
MELBOURNE APEC FINANCE CENTRE (2011), http://www.apec.org.auldocs/l 1 CON GFC
/Regulatory/ 20Reform%2OPost/2OGFC-%200verview%20Paper.pdf
143 Robin Ratcliffe, An Industry Imperative: Enhancing Consumer Protection in
Microfinance, MICROFINANCE INSIGHTS (2009), available at http://www.accion.org/Docum
ent.Doc?id=637.
14 Brigit Helms & Xavier Reille, Interest Rate Ceilings and Microfinance: The Story So
Far, CGAP OCCASIONAL PAPER (2004), http:www.cgap.org/sites/default/files/CGAP-
Occasional-Paper-Interest-Rate-Ceilings-and-Microfinance-The-Story-So-Far-Sep-2004.pdf
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command-and-control rules from bureaucrats. Neither side is completely
satisfied, but a policy of transparency meets them halfway.145
Substituting "loans made to poor people" for the word microcredit or
microfinance hones attention to a couple of basic problems with
transparency as policy. A summary of transparency circulated by
Oikocredit, an international organization founded by church leaders in 1975
to support fledgling enterprises with loan capital, notes the custom of
microfinance analysts to estimate loan prices "by looking at institutional
portfolio yields."l 4 6  Yields do not reveal the prices of loans when an
institution offers multiple products at multiple prices. 14 7
Lenders do not follow any unitary convention in articulating the price of
a loan. Two popular metrics, annual percentage rate and total cost of credit,
count the cost of borrowing differently and compete with other
alternatives.14 8 Even if regulators and lenders wanted to agree on criteria
and terminology for loan disclosure, individual borrowers present divergent
conditions for lenders: they present a range of credit histories, and market
conditions can make the price of money labile in a region.149 Prices vary in
response to other conditions, including the sizes of loans, transaction costs
that lenders associate with particular loans, inflation, taxes, and the maturity
of the lending institution.so
And even if prices could be stated clearly and consistently, poverty
impedes what individuals can learn about the terms banks offer them as
customers. One expert on financial-literacy initiatives has concluded that
"the gulf between the literacy levels of most Americans and that required to
assess the plethora of credit, insurance, and investment products sold
today-and new products as they are invented tomorrow-will not be
145 This midpoint gives transparency the appearance of transcending partisanship. See
generally JACQUELINE BEST, THE LIMITS OF TRANSPARENCY: AMBIGUITY AND THE HISTORY
OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCE (2006) (arguing that calls for transparency mask political
struggles and that as policy, transparency is never just a simple corrective to shortfalls of
information in a market).
146 Alexandra Fiorillo, Pricing Transparency in Microfinance: No Single Price for
Microloans, MFTRANSPARENCY.ORG (Oct.24, 2011), http://www.mftransparency.org/pricing-
transparency-in-microfinance-no-single-price-for-microloans/.
147 id
148 Interview by OIKO CREDIT with Chuck Waterfield, CEO of MicroFinance
Trasnsparency (Feb. 10, 2012) available at http://www.mftransparency.org/pricing-transpa
rency-in-microfinance-interview-with-chuck-waterfield-ceo-of-mftransparency/.
149 Alyssa Hansen, The Interest Rate Debate: How is Oikocredit Protecting Clients?,
OIKO CREDIT (Aug. 9, 2011), http://oikocreditusa.org/the-interest-rate-debate-how-is-
oikocredit-protecting-clients/.
1o id.
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bridged."' Poor people in the United States are relatively rich. In India,
one study of micro-borrowers "found that only 17 percent of respondents
were able to solve the arithmetic problem 'divide 8,000 by 10' and only
three percent of respondents could multiply '4,500 by 18."',152 Borrowers
typically misunderstand the interest rates they pay.'13
In debates over the regulation of loans made to poor people, the other oft-
mentioned reform idea, price controls, serves as a kind of complement to
transparency. Transparency enjoys popularity among reformers and other
observers but warrants concern. Limits on the amounts of interest that
lenders can lawfully charge borrowers have generally been decried; 5 4 they
may deserve more support.
Critics of interest rate caps emphasize the truism that poor people's
banking is a costly business. If limited to prices that would not shock
observers who have ready access to loan capital, lenders to a poor clientele
could not make money. They would cater to the well-banked sector, whose
loans are cheaper to administer. In turn poor people, cut off from well-
regulated credit, must resort to "moneylenders" or "loan sharks." These
epithets connote disrespect for the rule of law, predatory tactics to get loans
repaid and, of course, interest rates even higher than the high prices a well-
regulated lender would charge without caps.
Regulators might keep in mind the analogous critique of minimum wage
legislation as a reform to enhance welfare for the poor. For market-
modelers in the academy, it once was axiomatic that employment rates and
minimum hourly wages are inversely correlated. Any employer, according
to the axiom, would choose to do without labor-switching to machinery,
perhaps, or offshore manufacture-unless that labor came cheap, and so
policymakers could have robust domestic employment or good wages but
not both. Experience refuted the hypothesis.'
15 Lauren E. Willis, Against Financial-Literacy Education, 94 IOWA L. REv. 197, 201
(2008).
152 See Karnani, supra note 2, at 50.
1 Akhand Tiwari, Anvesha Khandelwal & Minakshi Ramji, How Do Microfinance
Clients Understand Their Loans?, CENTRE FOR MICRO FINANCE (2008), http://ifrnr.ac.in
/cmf/publications/wp/2008/25_Ramji_Loan%2OContractsFinancial%2OLiteracy.pdf
154 Priyadarshee & Ghalib, supra note 45, at 7-9 (summarizing the debate).
15s The leading monograph on the minimum wage concludes that raising it does not harm
employment. DAVID CARD & ALAN B. KREUGER, MYTH AND MEASUREMENT: THE NEW
ECONOMICS OF THE MINIMUM WAGE (1995) (reporting empirical studies). See also Steven
Greenhouse, A Campaign to Raise the Minimum Wage, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2012, at BI
(reporting a suggestion that the minimum wage be raised as an economic stimulus: more
wage income means more cash in the hands of spenders). Disagreement continues. On state
and local data in the U.S., compare Debra Burke, Stephen Miller & Joseph Long, Minimum
Wage and Unemployment Rates: A Study of Contiguous Counties, 46 GONz. L. REV. 661
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For loans made to poor people, experience within a domestic economy
can serve a similar function, informing the to-cap-or-not-to-cap question.' 5 6
Studies of microlending have yielded mixed results. Ecuador has fared well
with limits on interest rates,157 Vietnam poorly.'58  Regulators in a
jurisdiction can consider how their setting resembles, or differs from, other
places where interest rate caps have succeeded. Caps are likely to function
better where microloan markets are dominated by monopoly providers,
because restrictions on lenders' rents would invite in more entrants to
compete with the monopolist and, at least in theory, drive loan prices
down.'" 9 Loosening the clutch of monopoly power is a regulatory goal that
interest rate caps can advance. Here policymakers have available the
experience of South Africa, where legislation authorizes the government to
impose interest rate controls in response to market data.16 0
Another consumer-regulatory direction that experience can guide is the
prohibition of abusive repayment tactics. 161 Like transparency and interest
rate caps, this reform can deliver only so much and implementers ought to
remain aware of its limitations. Predatory lenders foreclosed by law
enforcement from one type of predation would presumably try to shift to
(2010-2011) (finding an adverse effect on employment) with Scott D. Miller, Atrophied
Rights: Maximum Hours Labor Standards Under the FLSA and Illinois Law, 28 N. ILL. U. L.
REv. 261, 279 (2008) (observing that after Illinois raised its minimum wage, its employment
rate went up).
156 Compare Elin M. King, Vietnam's Decree on Microfinance: A Flawed Attempt to
Create an Enabling Legal Environment for Microfinance, 17 PAc. RIM L. & PoLY J. 187
(2008) (arguing that caps failed in Vietnam) with Megan Whittaker, South Africa's National
Credit Act: A Possible Model for the Proper Role ofInterest Rate Ceilings for Microfinance,
28 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 561 (2008) (arguing that caps succeeded in South Africa).
15 See Bill Payne & Gray Skinner, Microfinance Regulation: Interest Rate Caps and
Concept of Usury 57 (2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at: http://works.bepress.
com/grayskinner/1 (reporting success in Ecuador). "I'm not in favor of interest rate caps,"
wrote the founder of MF Transparency in a comment left on the CGAP microfinance blog:
but I would say that a main factor for forcing MFIs [microfinance institutions] to think
harder about their pricing has been pricing caps. . . . When there isn't price
competition, when there isn't pricing transparency, when there aren't pricing caps,
MFIs-especially for-profit MFIs--don't have much incentive to really think hard
about reducing the prices they are charging the poor.
Richard Rosenberg, Competition Gets a Pat on the Back, CGAP (Feb. 7, 2012),
http://www.cgap.org/blog/competition-gets-pat-back (reporting a comment from Chuck
Waterfield)
1 King, supra note 156.
1 See Karnani, supra note 2, at 50-51.
160 Whittaker, supra note 156, at 580-81 (adverting to the National Credit Act of 2005,
which allows a trade minister to set interest rate caps based on market data).
161 See Dowling, supra note 40, at 1086 (describing predatory loan collection tactics in
Andhra Pradesh).
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another; regulators cannot expect that abusive lenders will live within
decent means of obtaining repayment. It remains desirable, however, to
remind lenders that loan payments may be pursued by some means and not
others. Enforcement of legal controls on repayment tactics, in turn, returns
to transparency. Enforcement tells borrowers which burdens of their
repayment struggle must be endured and which are unacceptable because
they violate the law.162
For regulators, the clearest guidance from experience is that it is
desirable to prevent, or at least discourage, individual microdebtors from
taking out several unsecured loans at the same time. 16 3 This regulatory
stance-a frankly paternalistic intervention-constrains lending while
keeping the vulnerability of individual debtors in mind. Legal interferences
in voluntary transactions are always difficult to enforce: but this species of
interference, with recent histories of default so fresh in mind, will likely
warrant the necessary effort and cost. Experiments in securitization and
other technologies that increase the pool of loan capital function more
safely when regulators can thwart the making of multiple unsecured loans
to the same low-income borrower. We now look more closely at this
innovation.
2. Optimizing Loan Capital: Toward Sustainability
Researchers report, on one hand, a problem of too little loan cash
available for the world's poor to borrow for microenterprises and, on the
other, instances of crisis where too much money flooded a particular loan
market too suddenly.16 The word "sustainable" describes what regulators
ought to pursue when they try to optimize loan capital. An increase in the
supply of money will, when it is sustainable, permit poor people to borrow
more at their election while at the same time not mire individuals in debts
they cannot repay.
"Sustainability" is, to be sure, a conclusory term that tends to emerge
only in its absence; when large numbers of borrowers default and portfolios
go bad, observers condemn the initial lending in the aggregate as
unsustainable. The term can nevertheless be applied to consider one
technique, securitization, that sets out to enlarge microloan capital.
162 See Tiwari, supra note 153 (reporting findings that borrowers do not know which
repayment tactics are permitted, and that they do not disapprove of some tactics prohibited
by law as abusive).
163 Multiple loans to the same borrower has been a common thread in microloan failure at
the national level. See supra Part I.B.
164 Deborah Burand, Deleveraging Microfinance: Principles for Managing Voluntary
Debt Workouts ofMicrofinance Institutions, 27 J.L. & CoM. 193, 194 (2009).
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Corporate finance scholar Steven Schwarcz has expounded on the prospects
of securitization, using "sustainable" in an article title. 165
More microloan capital can be raised, Schwarcz argues, by the issuance
to investors (not "donors"' 66 ) of shares in special-purpose entities
established to lend money to low-income borrowers. 6 7 When buying the
opportunity to collect on existing loans, this special-purpose entity would
offer "regenerative securitization"; a bolder "transformative securitization"
occurs when it moves beyond buying receivables and makes new loans. 68
This influx of investment capital could make microloans not only more
available but cheaper.169 Securitization means that no intermediary stands
between investors and borrowers.170 A loan price thus need not include any
retail markup, which is the difference between the lower interest rate at
which a bank borrows and the higher interest rate at which it lends.' 7' The
special-purpose entity does not borrow and so need not "buy low, sell
high." 72  At least in principle, securitization offers poor people cheaper
loans than what commercial banks can provide. The proposal has been
implemented.'73
Securitization of loan receivables is risky, however. Investors,
borrowers, and financial systems have felt its repercussions. Special-
purpose vehicles are key constituents of the "shadow banking system,"
which moves financial transactions out of the safety of prudential
regulation.174  Two other terms of popular alarm-"derivatives" and
"collateralized debt obligations"-describe what Schwarcz praises as a
source of new microloan capital. As one settlement of a notorious
165 Steven L. Schwarcz, Disintermediating Avarice: A Legal Framework for
Commercially Sustainable Microfinance, 11 U. ILL. L. REv. 1165 (2011).
166 1dat 1197.
Id. at 1175.
168 id.
169 Id. at 1176.
170 Id. at 1171.
71Id. at 1169.
172 Id.
173 Id. at 1177. CGAP and the Grameen Foundation jointly published a guide for
microfinance institutions considering securitization. Peter Humphreys & Alexandra
Moosally, Securitization: A Technical Guide, CGAP (2010), http://www.cgap.org/sites/
default/files/CGAP-Technical-Guide-Securitization-Oct-2010.pdf.
174 This term was coined by Paul McCulley. See Bryan J. Noeth & Rajdeep Sengupta, Is
Shadow Banking Really Banking?, THE REGIONAL EcoNoMIST (2011), http://www.stlouis
fed.org/publications/pub-assets/pdf/re/201 l/d/shadowbanking.pdf. See also PAUL
KRUGMAN, THE RETURN OF DEPRESSION ECONOMICS AND THE CRISIS OF 2008 (2009)
(depicting shadow banking as at the center of the financial crisis).
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complaint has demonstrated, a special-purpose vehicle can injure investors
who receive false information about the investments it holds. 75
The dangers of special-purpose investment vehicles spread beyond
investors, as indicated by the fall of home mortgages in the United States.
Holders of securitized mortgages are less likely than mortgagees whose
loans are not securitized to obtain loan modifications that allow them to
stay in their homes, in part because of the different incentives for portfolio
lenders and securitization servicers: a securitization servicer "does not care
what the property brings in at a foreclosure . . . because the servicer is paid
off the top. As long as there is just some land value left, the servicer will
get paid."'7 6  Wide-scale loss of homes worsens the consequences of
economic reversal in a region. Residents are displaced, neighboring
properties decline in value, and what had been collateral for a loan
dissipates. At the institutional level, collapses of securitized vehicles can
grow big enough to raise the prospect of a government bailout-"too big to
fail" makes ironic reference to what is in fact a catastrophic failure, with
costs borne by nonparticipants-and a bailout in turn deepens perceptions
of collapse.
Should regulators choose to reject or discourage securitization of
microloan capital, however, "transformative,' 77 shifts in how borrowers
reach this money are relatively unlikely to emerge. Conventional banking
for poor people-furnished by commercial banks, nonprofits, and
aggregations of customer-owners 'M-keeps the supply of loan cash more
constant, but this constancy may be inadequate. Microloan cash supplies
unenlarged by the dramatic increases that securitization can bring is too
limited to meet the needs of both low-income individuals and low-income
national economies, whereas too much cash encourages lenders to make
multiple loans to the same borrower. Optimizing loan capital thus calls for
care in rulemaking, as the perils of both under- and over-supplying money
have been well documented.
IV. REGULATION DISAGGREGATED, SECOND PASS: A Focus ON OWNERS
Imagine a rule-writer unaware of, or unpersuaded by, the thesis of this
Article that microfinance must be disaggregated before it can be regulated.
1s SEC v. Citigroup Global Markets, Inc., 673 F.3d 158, 161 (2d Cir. 2012) (reviewing a
proposed $285 million settlement of a civil complaint).
176 Adam Levitin, Is Redefault Risk Preventing Mortgage Loan Mods?, CREDIT SLIPS
(July 16, 2009, 2:03 PM), http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2009/07/is-redefault-risk-
preventing-mortgage-loan-mods-.html.
17 Schwarcz, supra note 165, at 1175.
178 See infra Part IV.
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This regulator might set out to codify the rules of microfinance in one
unitary compilation-and promptly face a palimpsest of existing laws. The
slate on which they write is not blank. Banking law might or might not
govern a microfinance entity, depending on whether the entity fulfills a
legal definition of a bank. Corporate governance law, which focuses on
ownership, will apply divergently to businesses that can be held in different
modes and may or may not pursue economic rents for owners.179 This Part
turns to owners of microfinance-providing entities.18 0
A. Pertinent Distinctions Among Providers
A sorting device that offers particular use to regulators is a relatively
simple question: Who owns the entities that furnish credit and savings to
low-income clients, and what do these owners want? Institutions that
provide financial services to the poor may be classified along many lines.
The smallest number of cohorts that pertain to regulation is three.'' I
179 One early study of microfinance institutions identified three categories and seven
types. See van Greuning et al., supra note 20 and accompanying text (describing the World
Bank's Framework for Regulating Microfinance Institutions).
1so Like every other discussion of regulation that pays attention to who owns and governs
firms, this Part owes a debt to Henry Hansmann, whose writings on the law of business
associations and donor-funded entities span decades. HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP
OF ENTERPRISE (1996) [hereinafter HANSMANN, OWNERSHIP]; Henry B. Hansmann, The Role
ofNonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835 (1980); Henry Hansmann, Ownership ofthe Firm,
4 J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 267 (1988); Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward a Single
Model of Corporate Law?, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REGIMES: CONVERGENCE AND
DIVERSITY 56 (Joseph A. McCahery et al. eds., 2002).
181 Cf Bernstein, supra note 82, at 22-23 (noting another division, by Hans Dieter Seibel,
of microfinance institutions into three categories: informal, semiformal, and formal). Some
writers favor a number smaller than three. In The Ownership of Enterprise, Hansmann
works with the number two, dividing firms into for-profit versus non-profit and
distinguishing those owned by producers from those owned by consumers. HANSMANN,
OWNERSHIP, supra note 180, passim. For present purposes, however, I find a third group
necessary: so much of the financial lives of poor people consists of mutual aid, and the
entities formed are often neither for-profit nor nonprofit. Another owner-focused division
into two categories restricts "microfinance" to formally incorporated providers and says that
other providers offer "informal finance." Mark Schreiner, Informal Finance and the Design
of Microfinance, 11 DEV. IN PRAC. 637 (2000). This dichotomy ignores myriad legal
distinctions between for-profit and nonprofit entities that pervade regulation. A third route
to the number two is to divide providers into those that offer savings and those that offer
loans. Prudential rules keep the former category relatively small and regulate it more
stringently. This division makes some sense, but I contend it makes even more sense for
regulators to focus on the point of view of an owner: its risks, its returns, what it wants. For
numbers bigger than two, see, for example, Joselito Gallardo, A Framework for Regulating
Microfinance Institutions: The Experience in Ghana and the Philippines, THE WORLD BANK
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divide them here into (1) mutual aid, (2) nonprofit, and (3) for-profit
institutions.182
The mutual aid category covers microfinance providers that pool and
distribute money to and for a group of individuals. These entities fall under
the rubric of what Henry Hansmann called "customer-owned enterprise"; 83
they also illustrate what Hans Dieter Seibel has deemed "member-owned
institutions based on social solidarity." 18 4  Mutual-aid microfinance
providers can hold loans and collect money without regulatory oversight,
but regulated entitles like credit unions also fit in this group.
Charitable nonprofit microfinance providers offer financial services to
low-income clients consistent with a philanthropic mission, typically
pertaining to economic development or the alleviation of poverty. Whereas
entities in the mutual-aid category can be regulated or unregulated,
nonprofit entities are always regulated by some domestic law. Typically
they are not overseen by a bank superintendency, however. Only a
minority of nonprofit microfinance institutions are licensed to take deposits
or held to prudential regulations aimed at promoting safety for clients. 8 5
Nonprofit microfinance institutions offer credit more than any other
financial product.
For-profit microfinance institutions seek returns for investors, rather than
the gains for customer-owners that mutual-aid entities pursue or the
philanthropic missions that define nonprofits. For these providers,
microfinance is a source of income derived most readily by charging
interest on loans. Other microfinance products-savings and insurance in
particular-can be profitable too; but lending is the most remunerative
24 (2001), http://wwwl.worldbank.org/finance/assets/images/2755.pdf (noting that Ghanian
and Philippine laws divide microfinance providers into numerous cohorts, some regulated
and some unregulated).
182 The categories contain some overlap. This Article uses "nonprofit" as a rough
synonym for charity, referencing an eleemosynary mission. Should a mutual-benefit entity
be incorporated as a nonprofit, I would put it in the mutual-aid rather than the nonprofit
category because it lacks this mission, focusing instead on gains for its member-owners. I
also believe that a classification focused on ownership can include nonprofits, the notion that
a nonprofit corporation cannot have owners notwithstanding. See Henry B. Hansmann,
Reforming Nonprofit Corporation Law, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 497, 574 (1981) (reminding
readers that most generalizations about nonprofits contain exceptions). For purposes of this
Article, the "owners" of a nonprofit are those persons who govern the corporation.
183 HANSMANN, OWNERSHIP, supra note 180, at 149.
184 Hans Dieter Seibel with Andrea Armstrong, Reparations and Microfinance Schemes,
in THE HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS, 676, 691 (Pablo De Greif ed., 2006).
185 Christen, Lyman, & Rosenberg, supra note 25, at 25.
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microfinance activity and so some entities that are licensed to take deposits
choose to forgo savings and focus on loans.18 6
Ghana offers an illustration of the three categories at work in one
country. Mutual aid microfinance in this country takes the form of susu, a
term for pooled savings and credit.187 Participants in a susu, following the
rotating-credit model, turn over small sums to a collector, who pays out the
pool to individuals in rotation. 188 Although efforts are underway to regulate
this form of microfinance,189 the category remains in the informal tier. An
example of a nonprofit microfinance institution is Microfin Plus Ghana, a
registered NGO that lists as its partners both the Ghana Cooperative Susu
Collectors Association, at the informal end, and Barclays, a bank. 190 First
Allied Savings and Loan is an example of a Ghanaian for-profit
microfinance institution. 9 '
In another country, Mexico, the mutual aid sector includes the tanda, a
credit association formed by individuals in small groups united by
acquaintance and a degree of mutual trust.19 2 An example of a Mexican
nonprofit microfinance institution is the Mexican Association for Rural and
Urban Transformation, whose website announces work in "education,
hygiene, healthy diets, appropriate technology, microfinance, emergency
support, infant care centers and more." 93 Compartamos Banco, having
186 ROBINSON, supra note 58, at 234.
17 Kent McKeever, A Short History of Tontines, 15 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 491,
516 (2010) (noting that susu is the West African word for an entity known as a tontine in
French-speaking countries like Togo and Cote d'Ivoire, and an esusu in Nigeria).
188 Id.
19 "Since 1990 the Ghana Cooperative Susu Collectors Association (GCSCA) is trying
to minimize fraud and regulate the operations of Susu collectors across the country." Thilo
Kunzemann, Do You Susu?, ALLIANZ (Feb. 20, 2010), http://www.knowledge.allianz.com
/search.cfm? I 14/do-you-susu.
190 See Partnership, MICROFIN PLUS GHANA, http://microfinplusghana.org/index.php?
option=com_content&view-article&id=12&Itemid=12 (last visited Nov. 1, 2012).
191 See About FASL, FIRST ALLIED SAVINGS AND LOANS, http://www.firstalliedghana
.com/about.php (last visited Nov. 1, 2012).
192 For an anthropological account of the Mexican tanda, see Donald V. Kurtz &
Margaret Showman, The Tanda: A Rotating Credit Association in Mexico, 17 ETHNOLOGY
65, 67-68 (1978); for a contemporary U.S.-based account, see Nezua, In Tough Economic
Times, Will a Tanda Work for You?, EL MACHETE (Aug. 4, 2009, 1:03 PM),
http://theunapologeticmexican.org/elmachete/2009/08/04/in-tough-economic-times-will-a-
tanda-work-for-you/ (encouraging Mexican-Americans who need cash to explore this
tradition).
'93 See AMEXTRA, http://www.amextra.org/lamextraingles.html (last visited Nov. 3,
2012).
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started microfinance operations as an NGO, shifted to the for-profit
category in 2006.194
The large cohort of nonprofits offering microfinance in a third country,
India, includes Bhoomika, a registered charity with operations in the state
of Orissa; among providers in the for-profit group is SKS, continuing its
microlending in troubled Andhra Pradesh.19 5  Self-help groups dominate
informal microfinance in India following an initiative by the National Bank
for Agricultural and Rural Development. This central bank enlists
nonprofits to help assemble groups of ten to twenty poor people, typically
women. The self-help group meets regularly to discuss social issues and
poor funds in a small savings account. When deposits are large enough, the
group can make loans to members, and after it has built a history of
disbursing and collecting these internal loans, it becomes eligible for
commercial lending.1 96
B. Owner-Specific Attentions
1. Microfinance as Mutual Aid
The mutual-aid category ranges in sophistication from humble rotating
savings-and-credit associations to well-capitalized and technologically
advanced credit unions. Mutual-aid entities of the first type are in the
typology of Hans Dieter Seibel "informal" microfinance institutions,
meaning unregulated entities; credit unions are "formal," regulated as banks
and typically licensed to take deposits.1 97 This divergence in regulatory
attention-from none to much-limits what can be said about attentions
194 See COMPARTAMOS BANco, http://www.compartamos.com/wps/portal/AboutCompart
amosBanco/History (last visited Nov. 3, 2012). For a critical account of the reincorporation
and initial public offering of Compartamos, see Malcolm Harper, The Commercialization of
Microfinance: Resolution or Extension of Poverty?, in CONFRONTING MICROFINANCE:
UNDERMINING SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 49, 50-51 (Milford Bateman ed., 2011).
195 See SKS MICROFINANCE, http://www.sksindia.com/know sks.php (last visited Nov. 3,
2012). See also Felix Salmon, The Lessons of Andhra Pradesh, REUTERS (Nov. 18, 2010),
http:/Iblogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2010/11/18/the-lessons-of-andhra-pradesh/ (faulting
SKS for an initial public offering that enriched the bank's principals without enhancing
wealth for its poor clientele); AKULA, supra note 99 (describing SKS from the vantage point
of its Indian-American founder).
196 See generally Klaus Deininger & Yanyan Liu, Policy Research Working Paper,
Longer-Term Economic Impacts of Self-Help Groups in India, THE WORLD BANK (2009),
http://elibrary.worldbank.org/docserver/download/4886.pdfexpires=l 351993334&id=id&a
ccname=guest&checksum=23F566C1 2E348B42F7B4BAC64CE47769 (summarizing
formation and operations).
197 See supra note 181 (referring to the tiers-framework associated with Seibel).
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specific to this type of ownership. Existing regulation treats mutual-aid
providers differently from one another, as it should, depending on whether
these providers do business as chartered banks. Despite this variation in the
category, each mutual-aid banking entity is like all the others in that it
seeks, at least in principle, to increase the prosperity and financial security
of the client-members who own, spend, save, and borrow its money.
This goal not only unites modest rotating savings and credit associations
with prosperous credit unions and the all mutual-aid entities in between
(large rotating savings and credit associations and fledgling credit unions,
for example), but distinguishes this category from the other two. For a for-
profit entity, microfinance exists to return earnings to investors; a nonprofit
provides microfinance to advance its mission. Mutual-aid microfinance-
again, in principle-recognizes no such external goals or beneficiaries. It
pays no dividends, sells no shares on any exchange, and advances no
philanthropic ends. The mutual-aid entity exists for its own sake.
The simplicity of this agenda makes the mutual-aid category of
microfinance uniquely attractive for what it lacks and eschews. Existing
only for itself gives the entity independence. The absence of external
investors and donors means more power, once again in principle, for
owner-clients. Geographic constraints and restrictions on who may join, if
available, keep the entity responsive to the communities to which it is tied.
Because its members have to live with the results it occasions, the mutual-
aid entity is likely to be the most risk averse of the three kinds of
microfinance provider.
And so, in the name of safety, regulatory policy might plausibly favor
this sector over the other two. Regulators in Britain reached a pertinent
conclusion in 2012 following a report by the Department for Work and
Pensions ("Department").'98 The expansion of credit unions, according to
this report, offered great promise to the national economy as well as
millions of low-income Britons trapped in predatory lending.'99 The UK
government established a E38 million fund, directed mainly toward
information technology "to modernise" credit union operations, building on
an appropriation of E15 million in the previous year.20 0 In addition to
allocating funds to credit unions for infrastructure, the Department
expressed support for regulatory relief, announcing its openness to
198 Sarah Neville, Report Calls for Expansion of Credit Unions, FINANCIAL TIMES (May
24, 2012, 10:24 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/7cc3edb2-9abf-1lel-9c98-00144feab
dcO.html#axzz2BDKahOXn.
199 Id
200 Freud Announces Further Investment To Secure Future of Credit Unions,
DEPARTMENT FOR WORK AND PENSIONS (June 27, 2012), http://www.dwp.gov.uk/ne
wsroom/press-releases/2012/jun-2012/dwpO7O-l2.shtml.
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increasing the interest rate cap on credit union loans from 2 to 3 percent per
month.201
This instance of favoritism for the mutual-aid sector of microfinance,
though responsive to conditions in one country only, illustrates a direction
that other regulators can take. A strong mutual-aid sector can compete
robustly with nonprofits and commercial banks in the provisioning of
savings accounts and loans to low-income clients. How much
encouragement it should receive might be debated, but the defining
characteristic of owners-cum-customers presents a constructive alternative
to other sources of banking for poor people, which are entities that have
their own agendas.
2. Microfinance for Profit
Banking marketed to poor clients imposes significant regulatory
challenges yet is in another sense the simplest category for regulators to
consider. Extraction of income through commerce is a pursuit that follows
predictable paths. The agenda for a mutual-aid or nonprofit microfinance
provider necessarily contains variety and can evolve, but an entity oriented
toward profit will rarely be distracted from this central goal. It may jettison
services and products in response to what markets deliver and what
regulators require, but it maintains its emphasis on earnings. Uniformity in
its agenda streamlines the regulatory response.
Putting aside as unregulable those providers popularly known as
moneylenders or loan sharks, 2 02 the for-profit group consists of commercial
banks, already a well-regulated cohort.2 03 And so most of the owner-
specific attention recommended here reduces to Carry On. Laws pertaining
to banking, tax, crimes, consumer protection, real property, insolvency,
secured transactions, and other fields are already in place--or can be
installed without fanfare-to regulate this sector.
Owner-specific attention adds a task to this familiar list, however. Much
more than the mutual-aid and nonprofit categories, for-profit microfinance
has tempted opportunistic politicians to encourage defaulting on loan
payments. The notorious "no pago" movement in Nicaragua had
counterparts elsewhere. 20 Even if regulators think that predatory
201 See Neville, supra note 198.
202 See discussion in supra note 10.
203 Well-regulated in a relative rather than an absolute sense: a jurisdiction that can
enforce any regulations at all will regulate its banks.
204 For more information on "no pago," see supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text.
See also In India, Microcredit Faces Uncertainty, MICROFINANCE AFRICA (Jan. 4, 2011 1:54
AM), http://microfinanceafrica.net/tag/microfinance-borrowers-commit-suicide/ (noting
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microlenders deserve to suffer, widespread failures to make loan payments
impose adverse effects on the larger community and should be forestalled.
Regulators familiar with historical instances of default-incitement like No
Pago can make a contingency plan. They might, for instance, establish
quantitative triggers for safeguards to fall in place without the need for
hasty emergency legislation.
3. Microfinance as Instrumental to a Nonprofit Mission
Of the three cohorts that offer banking for poor people, only the
nonprofit sector fits well with the Microfinance Needs Regulation impulse
to write a comprehensive and unitary rule-scheme.2 05 Nonprofit entities
work to generate income and stability for poor people, understood as their
beneficiaries. Banking advances a mission-to alleviate poverty, improve
the position of women, enhance national or regional economic
development, or otherwise carry out a donor-endorsed goal. The presence
of these donors gives regulators a distinct target not present in the mutual-
aid or for-profit categories.
Charity or nonprofit legislation--codified around the world-typically
addresses the desire of outsiders to know about an entity's financial
condition.2 06 Microfinance regulation for this category has a natural home
in statutory nonprofit law, which can compel these providers to describe
their operations by accounting for their money. Toward this end, drafters of
comprehensive proposals to regulate microfinance ought to consider
narrowing their compendia to focus on nonprofits only.
Model legislation or best practices that eliminate the mutual-aid or
customer-owned category on one hand, and for-profit entities on the other,
can address the concerns and operations of nonprofits. Topics eligible for
Principles for Nonprofit Microfinance Institutions could generate
transparency. Entities would be encouraged to make public declarations
about, inter alia, what "the double bottom line" means for their operations
incitements to default on loans in Pakistan circa 2008 and 2009); Interview by India
Knowledge at Wharton with Vijay Mahajan, President of the Microfinance Institutions
Network of India (July 26, 2012), available at http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/india
/articlepdf/4696.pdfCFID=229662359&CFTOKEN=1 7171314&jsessionid=a8309519c7ecf
8f8ffaf252517d5f85cl405 (reporting the same phenomenon in India).
205 See supra Part I.
206 In the United States, donors and prospective donors are understood as the
constituency that wants this information about finances; in the nonprofit law of other
countries, accounting to the government plays a stronger role. Alyssa A. DiRusso, American
Nonprofit Law in Comparative Perspective, 10 WASH. U. GLOB. STUD. L. REV. 39, 75-76
(2011).
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(for example, when sustainability and a charitable mission conflict, which
of the two will they pursue?), how their operations or priorities differ from
those of other nonprofits that offer microfinance, which services they offer
and plan to offer in the future, what other entities they work with, and how
they do business with their clients.207
This last transparency-topic, on client dealings, gives information to
borrowers as well as donors. We have noted that as a fix for the ills of
consumer banking, transparency has proved elusive, disappointing, and to
some observers even an impediment to meaningful reform.2 08 Those who
regulate the nonprofit cohort of microfinance providers would be wise not
to expect great consumer-protection strides forward from transparency as
policy. The exercise of communicating more accurately with one's donors
may, however, enhance entity-client communication. For example,
informing donors in standardized terms how much the entities charge
clients in interest on loans, a reform idea pressed for years by Microfinance
Transparency, 209 would put nonprofit providers in the habit of describing
their interest rates in more user-financially diction.
A variation on Principles for Nonprofit Microfinance Institutions ought
to foster the writing and enforcement of voluntary standards and
certification. Nonprofit managers have extensive experience with this
mode of reaching donors and fellow nonprofits. A microfinance provider
could use a certification mark to indicate its compliance with key terms of a
Principles compendium.21 o Charity or trademark law would in turn provide
redress for the wrongful use of this certification. Membership in a
voluntary-standards association would build a forum for peer discourse,
facilitating dialogues to raise standards. Even though managers of
nonprofit microfinance institutions working in a particular region compete
with one another and likely hold philosophical differences, they could agree
207 See Beth Rhyne, Social Performance: A Truth in Advertising Approach, CENTER FOR
FINANCIAL INCLUSION (Jan. 5, 2012), http://cfi-blog.org/2012/01/05/social-performance-a-
truth-in-advertising-approach/#more-4920 (advocating transparency among microfinance
nonprofits "to achieve mission-related results"). As with transparency generally, see supra
notes 143-54 and accompanying text, reformers should expect increases in the quantity and
quality of information acquired by nonprofit donors and clients to be modest at best. Entities
and individuals who want information and can benefit from it already have the power to
demand it; individuals who do not demand information about nonprofits are likely ill-
situated to gain from it when it arrives. I thank Dana Brakman Reiser for elucidating this
point.
208 See supra Part III.B.1.
209 About MicroFinance Transparency, MFTRANSPARENCY. ORG, http://www.mftrans
parency.org/about-our-organization/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2012).
210 This suggestion received a helpful airing from participants at a University of Maine
School of Law workshop.
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on norms of conduct and be able to list injurious behaviors that any
reputable institution would avoid and abjure.
4. Fitting the Three Provider Categories Together
After regulators disaggregate microfinance providers by focusing on
ownership, they can move to relations among the three groups. An analogy
to this "macro" approach to regeneration appears in competition law, which
addresses behaviors that enhance or thwart competition within an industry
or sector. Following the pattern of competition regulation (or antitrust, as
this field is more frequently known in the United States), which seeks to
promote multiplicity and choice in markets and to oppose monopolies,
regulators of microfinance disaggregated start out preferring multiple types
of ownership rather than a unitary model. Regulators who conclude that it
is desirable for all the categories to flourish might consider how to
encourage the continuing operations of each. They start by identifying the
conditions that cause providers in each category to abandon their provision
of financial services to poor people.
For-profit might look like the most durable type of provider. Entities
commonly transform themselves from nonprofit to for-profit; the reverse
move is rare.2 11 Yet for-profit providers of loans and savings are never,
pace the banking clich6, too big to fail. A for-profit entity whose loan
portfolio declines has little incentive to stick around in the way that a
mutual-aid or nonprofit provider, more tied to a community or a mission,
would wish to linger. Nonprofit sources of banking services can disappear
by various routes. They might leave one region to take up their work in
another, shift their mission and operations away from microfinance, run out
of money, or reincorporate as for-profits. A formally incorporated mutual-
aid provider like a credit union can live indefinitely,212 but a rotating
savings and credit association is likely to change along with the fortunes of
its members. Defaults or losses in a bad economic climate at one end, or
the opening of a commercial bank branch in response to prosperity at the
other, can end its reason for being. In sum, providers in all groups face
211 See generally John Tozzi, Turning Nonprofits into For-Profits, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK (June 15, 2009), http://www.businessweek.com/smallbiz/content/jun2009
/sb20090615_940089.htm (discussing the fact that For-Profit companies would not turn into
Nonprofit companies, because For-Profit companies' goals are to put shareholder profits
first).
212 But see Tim Worstall, It's the Mutual, Not for Profit, Banks Which Are the Problem in
Spain, FORBES (May 10, 2012, 12:13 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall
/2012/05/1 0/its-the-mutual-not-for-profit-banks-which-are-the-problem-in-spain/
(commenting on the decline of incorporated mutual-aid providers in Spain).
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conditions that can put them out of business. Enabling regulation can
nurture some or all of the groups.2 13
As was noted, favoring the mutual-aid category is a plausible starting
214
point. This stance rests mainly on the premise that remote investment
begets new and dangerous financial instruments that push underwriting
standards down.215 Banks rooted enough in their communities to suffer in
the event of defaults lend money on more sober terms. If their practices
had been universal, the disastrous residential real estate bubble that
emerged in the United States might have been fended off.2 16  The
drawbacks of securitization, amply showcased, support a regulatory stance
favoring those providers who have to live with the consequences of what
they lend and hold. In this perspective the third group, nonprofits, might
mean well (or might not) but nevertheless are inferior to mutual aid because
nonprofits furnish charity, which is in principle inferior to self-reliance.2 17
More scrutiny of this proposition ought to precede its implementation, as
there is no safe sector to provide banking for poor people. Nor is it obvious
how to allot this type of banking in ratio terms for the groups. What, after
all, is being distributed among the three: number of providers, number of
clients served, number of loans made, cash value of monies held, cash value
of loans outstanding? Even if regulators could in principle agree on how to
plan these balances ex ante, market conditions alter the distribution. What
regulators ought to pursue, instead, is the more modest goal of awareness.
Distinct patterns of ownership pervade microfinance, and shifts in the
relative balance of these holdings affect the experiences of clients and the
performance of microfinance more generally. 218
Although regulators may not know which sector to favor above the other
two, fitting the categories together leaves them plenty of other work.
Consider for example the desirability of competition. 2 19  Because the
213 See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
214 See supra notes 198-200 and accompanying text.
215 See Black, supra note 50.
216 Raymond H. Breschia, Trust in the Shadows: Law, Behavior, and Financial Re-
Regulation, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 1361, 1419-22 (2009). By way of response, a British
commentator noted the failure of the Spanish conglomerate Bankia, an entity formed by the
merger of "mutually owned, regional, usually not for profit banking entities." Worstall,
supra note 212.
217 "Give a man a fish, and you feed him for a day. Teach a man to fish, and you feed
him for a lifetime." 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 511 n.19 (1996)
(quoting the ancient Chinese proverb).
218 DiRusso, supra note 206, at 85.
219 That this goal is worth pursuing is axiomatic whenever poor people in a nation or
region face inadequate access to banking-with the important proviso that poor borrowers
should not have access to more loan money than they can reasonably repay. See supra note
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income that a nonprofit micro-lender receives is directed to a charitable
mission rather than paid out to investors, it has less incentive than a for-
profit to charge all it can get for its loans, and thus its presence in a loan
market may help to temper interest rates. 22 0 And because microloans are
relatively costly to administer, a for-profit lender that starts out making
small loans predictably will move to larger ones, which are cheaper to
administer on a dollars-borrowed basis. It is small loans that do the most to
alleviate unbankability. 22' Nonprofits are not immune to pressures to
charge higher interest rates and make bigger loans, but their mission
tempers the tendency.2 22 Accordingly, rules to encourage nonprofit
participation in regions where for-profit entities are making microloans
should be considered.
In fitting the three provider categories together, regulators are tasked with
managing relations that are both reciprocal and rivalrous. Nonprofits give
mutual-aid providers loan capital, options for safer savings, and advice
about how to pursue goals in which nonprofits have expertise. Both
nonprofit and mutual-aid entities can become institutional customers of for-
profit banks. Nonprofits frequently choose to work with mutual-aid entities
when seeking clients and for-profit banks when expanding their operations.
The nonprofit form has also been a way for entities to start their
microlending operations before going public as for-profit entities.2 23 For-
profit providers find customers in the mutual-aid sector, and rely on
nonprofit networks to find them.2 24 The groups also compete with one
another in the banking market.225
CONCLUSION
Rejecting microfinance as a category for legal regulation emphatically
does not reject microfinance as policy. Quite the contrary. Instead, I have
argued, moving away from this dense neologism will permit regulators to
178 and accompanying text.
220 See Rosenberg, supra note 157.
221 See DICHTER, supra note 90.
222 Kenneth Downey & Stephen J. Conroy, Microfinance: The Impact of Nonprofit and
For-Profit Status on Financial Performance and Outreach, ACAD. OF ECON. AND FIN.
(2012), http://www.econ-jobs.com/research/35795-Microfinance--The-Impact-of-Nonprofit-
and-For-Profit-Status-on-Financial-Performance-and-Outreach.pdf
223 See supra notes 194-95 and accompanying text (noting that two large for-profit
microfinance institutions, SKS in India and Compartamos in Mexico, started out as
nonprofits).
224 See supra note 187-96 and accompanying text.
225 See supra note 187-96 and accompanying text (giving Ghana, Mexico, and India as
examples of countries where all three categories offer banking for poor people).
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support the financial needs of poor people and the imperatives of a
maturing market by honing their attention on relevant specifics. Like its
Latinate cousins "development" and "industrialization," microfinance
remains central to economic and financial progress. The change that this
Article urges-attention to the products and providers that need
regulating-strengthens the sector.
Disaggregation is central to the undertaking. This Article has identified
the products of microfinance as loans and savings accounts offered to poor
persons, and the providers as falling into three groups: mutual-aid,
nonprofit, and for-profit entities. Governments and rule-drafters might well
disagree about these particulars. They can add to the list of microfinance
products,22 6 or choose a different number of providers. 227 The crucial point
for them to bear in mind is that microfinance is many things rather than
one.228
Disaggregation helps regulators to focus not only on the improvements
they want but the rules they already have.229 Sources of regulation already
in place-such as bank superintendencies, corporate registry authorities,
and self-regulatory organizations like trade associations and cooperatives
authorities-can advance the social-developmental goals of microfinance
without implicitly asserting, via the prefix "micro-," that transactions and
customers are and shall remain puny. Consumer protection law, banking
law, and prohibitions of abusive debt recovery practices furnish some
shelter for poor clients.
These existing safeguards are modest, of course. Meaningful protection
for consumers of financial services has proved difficult to codify and
enforce all over the world, and efforts to augment the bargaining power of
poor people in financial markets have yielded disappointing results.23 0
Should consumer protection make gains, however, the concept of
226 See Christen, Lyman, & Rosenberg, supra note 25, at 2 (suggesting that microfinance
might be understood to include not just savings and loans but also insurance and cash
transfers).
227 See Bernstein, supra note 181 (citing alternative ways to count and group providers).
228 For an example of how to do so without fuss, see Stijn Claessens, Patrick Honohan &
Liliana Rojas-Suarez, Policy Principles for Expanding Financial Access: Report of the CGD
Task Force on Access to Financial Services, CENTER FOR GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT (2009),
http://www.cgdev.org/files/1422882_fileFinancialAccessTaskForce-ReportFINAL.pd
f. The Center for Global Development, which describes itself as a "nimble, independent,
non-partisan" think tank, scarcely uses the term "microfinance" in this report. See About
CGD, CENTER FOR GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT, http://www.cgdev.org/section/about/ (last visited
Nov. 3,2012).
229 See generally BALDWIN & CAVE, supra note 8, at 9-16 (asking "Why regulate?").
230 See supra notes 145-52 and accompanying text (summarizing findings about the near-
futility of transparency and financial literary initiatives).
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microfinance will have played little role. Abstract polysyllabic words
speak to elites. This term has sited poor borrowers and savers at a
distance.23'
"The trouble with regulating microfinance," in sum, has distinct facets,
of which this Article has explored three. The first is definitional. A word
whose meanings are obscure, contested, or multi-layered can function well
elsewhere in a language, but regulation demands a more precise definition
of the sector or activity in question than this term offers. Second,
microfinance as a neologism has brought what looks like mood swings-
optimism, pessimism, centrism-to a workaday challenge. A less
distracted agenda, jargon- and buzzword-free, would return regulators to
their task of making loans and savings more available and safer.232 Third,
microfinance as big tent is too big to be regulated, because it includes
providers with too much divergence in their form and governance.2 33
Policymakers must at the same time keep microfinance in focus as policy
and recognize that it is not a single sector amenable to unitary regulatory
attention.
231 See supra note 9 and accompanying text; see also supra Part II.B.3.
232 See McNew, supra note 67.
233 See Marc Labie & Roy Mersland, Corporate Governance Challenges in
Microfinance, in THE HANDBOOK OF MICROFINANCE 283, 287 (Beatriz Armendiriz & Marc
Labie eds., 2011) (arguing that attention to corporate governance is integral to regulating
microfinance institutions).
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